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Abstract 
The primary purpose of the present study was to determine the 
effects of threat frequency and contingency on game-playing behaviour 
in a threat-vulnerable game. A second purpose was to determine the 
stability of these effects when strategies were altered during 
the final 75 trials of the game. Threat was operationally defined 
as the use of a particular choice in a threat-vulnerable game. 
One hundred students enrolled in undergraduate courses at Wilfrid 
Laurxer University played in one of nine programmed strategy 
conditions: all possible pairwise orderings of a passive, demanding 
contingent, and a demanding noncontingent strategy. The latter 
two strategies were yoked to one another and therefore differed 
only with respect to the contingency of threat. The passive strategy 
differed from the two demanding strategies in that the programmed 
opponent never used the available threat. Results indicated that 
both threat frequency and threat contingency had significant effects 
on the Column player's behaviour. However, the effects of contin-
gency were observed earlier in the interaction sequence. In 
addition, delayed strategy effects were only obtained for the 
contingency variable. Postexperimental questionnaire data revealed 
that, contrary to previous reports, attributions of incompetence and 
foolishness were not necessary conditions for an exploiter to take 
advantage of a passive opponent. 
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Introduction 
Game theory is one form of mathematical analysis of social 
phenomena, the foundations of which were laid by Von Neuman and 
Morgenstern (1944). Few repercussions were immediately felt in 
the social sciences because formal game theory is concerned with 
deriving the rational solutions to various games rather than 
examining the actual behaviour of players. To date, the theory 
has been put to use by political scientists, economists, and 
psychologists. 
The psychologist is interested in answering the question, 
"What determines how people play?" One method of answering this 
question is to manipulate a situational variable; the strategy of 
one of the players. When such a "player's" choices are predetermined 
by the experimenter and presented to the real player by a confed-
erate, computer or by the experimenter himself, such sequences are 
called programmed strategies. The real participant is usually 
induced to believe that these programmed strategies are actual 
choices made by another person because participants play differently 
against a computer, although the opponent's strategy in both cases 
is identical (Orcutt & Anderson, 1977). 
There is a number of different types of strategies, including 
contingent and noncontingent strategies. A contingent strategy 
relies upon the responses of the real player in determining what 
choice is delivered on a particular trial. Such choices, as 
delivered by the programmed opponent, are said to be conditionalized 
on the responses of the real player. In contrast, a noncontingent 
1 
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strategy delivers choices regardless of the responses made by 
the real player. A further distinction lies between concurrent 
and delayed strategy effects, a distinction first made by Oskamp 
(1971) in a comprehensive review of programmed strategy effects in 
mixed-motive games. Concurrent effects are those observed while 
strategies are continuing. Delayed strategy effects are observed 
once two or more different strategies have been discontinued, e.g., 
two groups receive different strategies initially, then both are 
treated identically for the remainder of the game. 
Oskamp's (1971) review indicated that the organization or 
patterning of programmed input had a much greater effect on part-
icipants' responses than the overall level of reinforcement 
provided. That is, in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, studies have 
shown that contingent strategies produce higher levels of cooper-
ative responding than noncontingent strategies having the same 
overall level of programmed cooperation. However, Oskamp (1971) 
also noted that the structure of the conflict situation must be 
regarded as a major factor in any general theory of conflict. 
Empirical studies have indicated that different effects are some-
times produced when similar variables are manipulated in strat-
egically different games. 
The present research was undertaken to examine the effects 
of contingent versus noncontingent strategies in a mixed-motive 
game which is strategically different from the Prisoner's Dilemma 
game: Game 21 in Rapoport and Guyer's (1966) taxonomy of 78 two-
person, two-choice games. Unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma game, 
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Game 21 has a payoff structure which is asymmetrical for the two 
participants. If both players select their dominant response, one 
player (Column) receives his most preferred payoff, while the other 
player (Row) receives his next-to-least preferred payoff. In 
order to induce the Column player to select his non-dominant 
response such that the Row player can obtain his most preferred 
payoff, the Row player may choose to employ his own non-dominant 
response. Such a response by the Row player is viewed as a tacit 
threat to the Column player because Column would obtain his own 
next-to-least preferred payoff if the Row player unilaterally 
shifts from his dominant to non-dominant response. 
Previous research using this game has indicated that the 
use of threat by the Row player (i.e., the choice of his non-
dominant response) is successful in gaining concessions from Column 
and arriving at a more jointly equitable distribution of payoffs 
(Guyer & Rapoport, 1970). Two studies which have compared passive 
strategies (non-use of threat by Row) to demanding strategies (use 
of threat by Row depending upon the specific sequence of Column's 
responding) have indicated that the Column player will select his 
non-dominant response more frequently when playing against a 
demanding contingent strategy than against a passive strategy 
(Gruder & Duslak, 1973; Guyer & Gordon, cited in Rapoport et al., 
1976). In addition, Guyer and Gordon (cited in Rapoport et al., 
1976) reported that the probability of the Column player selecting 
his non-dominant response after both players had selected their 
dominant responses (i.e., appeasement) was higher when Column 
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was playing against a demanding contingent strategy than against 
a passive strategy. 
While these studies clearly demonstrated that a demanding 
contingent strategy is more effective than a passive strategy in 
gaining concessions from the Column player, they do not indicate 
whether the organization or patterning of threats is the major 
factor or whether it is just the occurrence of threats irrespective 
of their patterning which is important in gaining concessions 
from the Column player. The primary purpose of this research 
was to determine the relative effects of the patterning of threats 
(i.e., contingency) as opposed to the mere occurrence of threats 
(i.e., frequency). This was accomplished by the inclusion of a 
demanding noncontingent strategy. The demanding contingent and 
demanding noncontingent strategies were yoked to one another and 
therefore differed only with respect to the contingency of threat 
(i.e., the frequency of threat was identical). The passive 
strategy differed from the two demanding strategies in that the 
programmed opponent never used the available threat. Therefore, 
the passive strategy differed from the demanding noncontingent 
strategy in threat frequency alone. A comparison of the concurrent 
effects of these three strategies permitted an assessment of the 
independent contributions of threat frequency and of threat 
contingency to gaining concessions from the Column player, 
A second purpose of the present study was to determine 
the effects of shifts in these three strategies on the behaviour 
of the Column player during the last 75 trials of the game. There 
are no studies in the literature which have examined the effects of 
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strategy shifts in threat-vulnerable games and an examination 
of these effects would establish boundary conditions for the threat 
contingency or threat frequency variables. For example, if threat 
contingency is the prime determinant of gaining concessions from 
the Column player during the initial 75 trials, would this also 
be the case during the final 75 trials regardless of the strategy 
experienced initially or would exposure to the initial strategies 
moderate the effects of threat contingency during the final 75 
trials? Answers to questions such as these were provided by an 
examination of the effects of strategy shifts. 
In order to accomplish these objectives, participants 
in the present study played in one of nine programmed strategy 
conditions: all possible pairwise orderings of a passive, demanding 
contingent, and a demanding noncontingent strategy. Six of the 
strategy conditions involved a shift in strategy following 75 
trials of the game while, for the remaining three strategy conditions, 
the programmed strategy remained the same for the entire duration 
of the game (150 trials). 
The following extensive review of the literature is intention-
ally general. It is presented to serve as a bibliographic directory 
for those readers interested in areas other than the topic of this 
paper but also to serve to illustrate the wide range of questions 
to which experimental games have been applied. The reader who is 
primarily interested in the specific research undertaken in this 
paper is invited to turn to page 57. 
Review of the Literature 
Overview of Game Theory 
Game theory employs as its basic model the game of strategy 
as distinct from the game of chance. To play a game against dice or 
nature is to make decisions under conditions of risk or uncertainty, 
a situation for which probability theory alone is a valuable tool. 
Yet sometimes we must make our decisions with respect to what we 
predict others will do, for the outcome is dependent not upon us 
alone but upon the combination of two or more persons' choices of 
action. 
Therefore what distinguishes games from nongames 
from the point of view of game theory . . . is 
whether certain choices of actions and certain out-
comes are unambiguously defined, whether the joint 
choices can be precisely specified, and whether the 
choosers have distinct preferences among the out-
comes . 
(Rapoport & Chammah, 1965, p. 17) 
A game theorist is interested in the following question: 
Given a particular game, what is the best way to play in order to 
maximize the minimum gain and minimize the maximum loss? This is 
a purely mathematical question which is based on the assumption 
that both players are rational. When both players are rational 
and choose their best strategies according to the dictates of 
formal game theory, the outcome is predetermined and nonindicative 
of anything other than the ability of the players to foresee all 
possible outcomes. 
6 
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The theory is considered to be a normative rather than a 
descriptive model of behaviour because it prescribes how a rational 
player should play a game. Downing (1975) has attempted to inte-
grate the prescriptive and descriptive models of behaviour by first 
deriving the rational solutions against various strategies of a 
simulated other in Prisoner's Dilemma games, and then examining 
how closely the behaviour of players in prior research conforms to 
the prescribed optimal strategies. 
Games involving two people with two choices each ( 2 X 2 
games) have most commonly been used as research tools. All such 
games can be represented in the general matrix form presented in 
Figure 1. Both players usually make choices simultaneously which 
determine the quadrant outcome (1, 2, 3 or 4). Outcomes are ex-
pressed in the form, RICl, Row's choice always appearing first. 
By convention, the payoff to the Row player on a particular trial 
is placed in the lower left of each quadrant. Column's payoff is 
in the upper right. By altering the relationships among the para-
meters a, b, c,and d, various games can be created. 
Some games are classified as zero-sum games. In such games 
the sum of the payoffs in each quadrant is zero. Rational behaviour 
consists of maximizing one's own payoff. In zero-sum games, maxi-
mizing one's own payoff necessarily minimizes the payoff to the 
other player. Therefore a rational player will play strictly com-
petitively because the interests of the two players are diametri-
cally opposed. There are two classes of zero-sum games: games with 
8 
Column (1) 
CI C2 
R1 
Row (2) 
R2 
\ . c, 
\ b, 
ba N. 
\ d, 
Figure 1. General Matrix Form 
9 
a saddlepoint and those without. A saddlepoint is an entry in a 
matrix in which the payoff to the Row player is simultaneously a 
minimum in its row and a maximum in its column. Figure 2 displays 
these two types of zero-sum games. 
In zero-sum games with a saddlepoint the best two rational 
players can do is to choose the strategy which contains the saddle-
point (Rapoport, Note 1). Row, if rational, will select Choice 2 
in such a game because +6 is the best of the worst payoffs. Like-
wise, a rational Column player will select Choice 1 using the iden-
tical logic. When these two choices are made, the outcome is the 
quadrant containing the saddlepoint (R2cl). Choosing a response 
on the basis of minimizing one's own losses and maximizing one's 
own gain is referred to as the minimax principle. The principle 
constitutes a general solution for all two-person zero-sum games 
with a saddlepoint. 
Zero-sum games without a saddlepoint must be solved in a 
different manner: The minimax principle no longer dictates the 
best strategy. A solution to such a game requires selecting either 
Choice 1 or 2 with certain probabilities. This is known as a mixed 
strategy in contrast to choosing on the basis of the minimax prin-
ciple, a pure strategy. 
Of more interest are games in which the interests of the 
players are partially opposed and partially coincident (nonzero-
sum or mixed-motive games). These games stand partway on the con-
tinuum from the simple to the more complex games. Not only conflict 
10 
Row 
Row 
Column 
CJ Q2. 
R1 
R2 
\-4 
4 \ 
\-6 
6 \ 
\ 2 
-2 \ 
\-8 
8 \ 
A. Zero-sum Game with 
Saddlepoint 
Column 
C1 C2 
R1 
R2 
\ 4 
-4 \ 
\-8 
8 \ 
\-6 
6 \ 
\ 2 
•2 \ 
B. Zero-sum Game without 
Saddlepoint 
Figure 2. Two Zero-Sum Games 
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between players but conflict within players becomes evident as each 
may be torn between cooperation for the common good and competition 
aimed at satisfying personal interest. Given that rational beha-
viour consists of making as many points for oneself as possible, 
what is the rational choice in such a game? Figure 3 displays the 
general matrix form of the Prisoner's Dilemma game or Game 12 in 
Rapoport and Guyer (1966) and also a Prisoner's Dilemma game matrix 
in which actual payoff values have been assigned. It should be 
noted that Game 12 is a symmetrical game. The motivational struc-
ture is identical for participants playing in the position of Row 
or Column. 
The relationship among the payoff parameters must satisfy 
the following: (a) S<P<R<T, and (b) 2R> S + T, in order for the 
game to be called Prisoner's Dilemma. The second condition is 
necessary in order to preserve the Rlcl outcome as the cooperative 
outcome. Otherwise players may take turns at obtaining T, the 
temptation or largest payoff. 
In a Prisoner's Dilemma game both players possess a domina-
ting strategy. This is a strategy in which a player can expect to 
do no worse and generally better regardless of the strategy chosen 
by the other player. For example, in Figure 3B, Column's domina-
ting strategy is Choice 2 because 5 is better than 3 and 1 is 
better than 0. Likewise, Row's dominating strategy is also Choice 
2. The individually rational choice, then, for both players, is to 
play Choice 2. If both do so, both receive 1 unit. This outcome, 
Row 
Row 
Column 
CI C2 , 
12 
R1 
R2 
\ R. 
R\ 
\s, 
T. \ 
X T, 
s,\ 
X R 
P
» \ 
A. General Matrix Form 
S < P < R <T 
2R> S + T 
Column 
CI C2 
R1 
R2 
\ 3 
3\ 
X 0 
5
 X 
\ 5 
0 \ 
\ 1 
1 \ 
B. Matrix with Values 
Assigned 
Figure 3. Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
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R2C2, is a strongly stable equilibrium, so called because neither 
player can unilaterally depart from it without diminishing his own 
payoff. Notice, however, that RlCl would result in greater pay-
offs to both players. This outcome is not an equilibrium. If 
Column or Row should unilaterally depart from the RlCl outcome, he 
can gain a larger payoff. Therefore, a dilemma exists between col-
lective and individual interests. The Rl or Cl choices are labelled 
cooperative responses. 
Games with three or more players differ radically from the 
two person games. One of the basic functions of n-person game 
theory is to give precision to the concept of potential power. A 
player can obtain a minimum payoff without joining any other, yet 
to obtain more he must form a coalition with at least one other 
player. Sometimes it is advantageous to join with a powerful 
player but if this should not be possible, a coalition with an im-
potent player in some games may aid in the maximization of gain. 
Thus, each player has some potential power which, with cooperation 
from others, may be realized. Since no sufficient theoretical 
model based on two-person game behavior has been built, it does not 
seem particularly fruitful to discuss n-person game theory but only 
to acknowledge its existence. 
Psychological Uses of Experimental Games 
A psychologist uses experimental games in an attempt to deve-
lop an empirical descriptive model of behaviour in conflict situa-
tions rather than a normative model of optimal behavior which as-
14 
sumes that both players are rational. The experimenter is primarily 
concerned with the question; What will happen when . . .? He is 
not usually interested in finding the best solution to the game. 
In general, studies indicate that players depart from the rational 
solutions prescribed by formal game theory (Guyer & Rapoport, 1970; 
Lieberman, 1960; Payne, 1965; Rapoport, Guyer, & Gordon, 1971; 
Tyszka & Grzelak, 1976). Psychological, sociological, and cultural 
factors can be assumed to be responsible for these departures. 
To the psychologist, the experimental game offers a unique 
method of examining how various factors affect the decisions made 
in conflict situations. Some psychologists view the game as a 
dependent variable: They view the strategy choices of the partici-
pants as indicative of how persons with certain personality charac-
teristics respond to real life conflicts. Hence, some research 
has been directed to the questions of how race (Knight & Mack, 1973), 
personality patterns (Bennet & Carbonari, 1976; Gillis & Woods, 
1971), or nationality (Rapoport et al., 1971) affect strategy 
choices. In such investigations the crucial element is how closely 
the game resembles the real life situation (Rapoport, Note 1). 
Guyer and Rapoport (1972) see this particular use of experimental 
games as a manifestation of the traditional approach to the study 
of behaviour insofar as characteristics of individuals are seen as 
the prime determinants of the way in which he or she chooses among 
alternatives. 
Rather than attribute gaming behaviour Lo cliar.icl <r i sL i <••: of 
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the individual, one can view the data as a consequence of the im-
mediate environment. From this point of view, it is not absolutely 
necessary that the game closely resemble some situation in real 
life, for a model of behaviour can be constructed and related to 
data generated by the manipulation of factors within that environ-
ment (e.g., the matrix, the use of a simulated other, "one shot" 
versus iterated plays, etc.). In other words, the treatment of the 
gaming environment as an independent variable may lead to a model 
based upon responses which are contingent upon the reinforcement 
structure of the situation. 
Despite the availability of 78 strategically different games 
(Rapoport & Guyer, 1966), psychologists have been preoccupied with 
the Prisoner's Dilemma game. This preoccupation is reflected in 
most reviews of the experimental gaming literature (Gallo & McClin-
tock, 1965; Nemeth, 1972; Oskamp, 1971; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; 
Rapoport & Orwant, 1962) although increasingly reference is being 
made to strategically different games (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; 
Rapoport, Guyer, & Gordon, 1976; Schlenker & Bonoma, 1978). 
Variables in Experimental Games 
"Gaming behaviour" is a general term representing a large 
number of very specific dependent variables. There is a preponder-
ance of Prisoner's Dilemma game studies in which the proportion or 
percentage of cooperative responding (termed C choices) is of 
prime concern, sometimes to the exclusion of stochastic measures, 
transitional probabilities, and the number or length of runs. 
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Stochastic measures refer to the probability of a certain 
response occurring on trial n given that a certain outcome had 
occurred on trial n - 1. A general way of describing such a 
probability is p(Rl/RlCl) and is read, "the probability of an Rl 
response given an RlCl outcome on the previous trial." If p(Rl/ 
RlCl) = 1, the Row player is always following an RlCl outcome 
with an Rl choice. 
Transitional probabilities refer to the probability of a 
particular outcome occurring on trial n given that a certain 
outcome occurred on trial n - 1. These answer such questions as: 
Given an Rlcl outcome, what are the respective probabilities of 
this outcome being followed by an RlC2, R2Cl, R2C2, or RlCl out-
come? 
Length of runs refers to the number of times a particular 
outcome sequentially occurs. Long runs are referred to as "lock-
ins". Usually what is examined is the duration or number of such 
runs, often RlCl or R2C2 runs. However, one can also investigate 
how such runs begin and end. -
Once participants have selected their choices over a given 
number of trials, the protocols can be analyzed to yield the above 
measures. These measures can often be interpreted in terms of 
"rich" psychological concepts. For example, with respect to the 
Prisoner's Dilemma game, the following propensities may be inter-
preted in descriptive psychological terms: (a) p(Rl/RlCl) as 
trustworthiness, (b) p(Rl/RlC2) as forgiveness, (c) p(Rl/R2Cl) 
17 
as repentance, and (d) p(Rl/R2C2) as trust (Amnon Rapoport & Mow-
showitz, 1966). 
One caution must be expressed with regard to interpreting 
these precise statistics in psychological terms: They vary in in-
terpretation just as the term "cooperative responding" differs 
between various strategically different games. Caution is appro-
priate but dismissing these measures is not. Regretfully, very 
few of these measures are reported in studies despite the fact 
that they are strongly interrelated by mathematical interdepen-
dencies to the more commonly reported response frequencies. Rapo-
port (Note 1) states that experimental games tend to be used 
so as to "read off" only one or two of these measures under a 
variety of experimental manipulations The choice of which ones 
to report usually depends upon the primary interest of the experi-
menter in how they relate to real life situations or existing psycho-
logical theories. Despite the size of this body of literature, 
results are often inconclusive because of (a) the small number of 
participants, and (b) the omission of what the individual experi-
menter considers irrelevant data in terms of his or her particular 
interest. 
The interest of the experimenter also dictates which of the 
three classes of independent variables will be manipulated in an 
experiment: (a) participant variables referring to characteristics 
of the players, (b) structural variables referring to the magnitude 
of payoffs or the relationship between payoffs, or (c) situational 
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variables referring to conditions present in the experiment. 
Participant Variables. A number of participant variables 
has been investigated in experimental games including family 
background (Crowne, 1966), personality patterns (Bennett & Car-
bonari, 1976; Deutsch, 1960; Gillis & Woods, 1971; Marin, 1973; 
Terhune, 1968, 1974), and sex of participants (Kahn, Hottes, & 
Davis, 1971; Oskamp & Perlman, 1965; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). 
Rapoport et al. (1976) states that the relationship between per-
sonality variables and game-playing behaviour is tenuous given the 
abundance of both positive and negative findings using existing 
personality tests (see Terhune, 1970, for a review). 
With respect to sex differences, the results are also mixed 
and appear to be affected by numerous other variables including 
the particular game (Caldwell, 1976; Carment, 1974; McNeel, McClin-
tock, & Nuttin, 1972; Miller, 1967), the sex of the opponent (Mack, 
Auburn, & Knight, 1971; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965), the sex of the 
experimenter (Skotko, Langmeyer, & Lundgren, 1974), the strategy of 
the other (Bixenstine, Chambers, & Wilson, 1964; Komorita, 1965; 
Smith, Vernon, & Tarte, 1975), and the length of the game (Rapoport 
& Chammah, 1965). The most well-substantiated finding is that males 
and females do not differ initially but do differ as a function of 
the interaction during iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games. Females 
tend to become progressively more competitive in these games. The 
usefulness of the sex variable as a predictor of game-playing be-
haviour has been called into question by Ingram and Berger (1977) 
in an article which demonstrated that individual difference dimen-
sions such as sex-role orientation affect the behaviour of women 
the Prisoner's Dilemma game. 
Structural Variables. Structural variables can refer to 
the magnitude of payoff parameters within a particular game matrix 
or the ordinal relationship among the payoffs. When the ordinal 
relationships among the payoffs are altered, different games are 
created. 
Some studies which have varied the magnitude of payoff para-
meters include Frenkel (cited in Rapoport et al., 1976), Guyer 
and Rapoport (1972), Jones, Steele, Gahagan, and Tedeschi (1968), 
Rapoport and Chammah (1965, 1966), and Steele and Tedeschi (1967). 
These studies attempted to identify predictors of choice in mixed-
motive games that exist within the game itself. This prediction 
of behaviour maybe aided by the establishment of utility functions 
for the players. A utility function indicates the value ascribed 
by a player to the possible outcomes in the game. Wyer (1969) 
attempted to determine whether behaviour in two-person games could 
be more easily predicted by transforming outcomes to utilities. 
A slightly greater proportion of the variance in participant's res-
ponses was accounted for by parameters defined in terms of utili-
ties than by similar parameters defined in terms of the payoff 
values shown on the game matrix. 
Studies which have directly compared the behaviour of player 
in different games include Miller (1967), Miller and Holmcfi (1975), 
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Swingle and MacLean (1971), and Swingle and Santi (1972). 
Rapoport et al., (1976) attempted to integrate available 
data from studies which investigated changes in the magnitude of 
payoffs. In both single-play (players choose only once per matrix) 
and iterated games, the player's choice frequencies generally re-
flected the direction of the corresponding changes in payoff mag-
nitude (no tests of significance were performed). 
Situational Variables. A large number of situational 
variables has been investigated within the experimental gaming 
literature including note-passing versus electronic feedback 
(Enzle, Hansen, & Lowe, 1975), the preexperimental relationship 
between protagonists (Wallace & Rothaus, 1969), information con-
cerning the opponent's past behavior (Braver & Rohrer, 1975), modes 
of presentation of the game (Guyer, Hamberger, & Fox, 1973; Hamber-
ger, 1974), how closely the experimental situation resembles a 
situation in real life (Young, 1977), the proximity of the players 
(Gardin, Kaplan, Firestone, & Cowan, 1973), incentive magnitude 
(Gallo, Funk, & Levine, 1969; Gallo & Sheposh, 1971; Knox & Douglas, 
1971; Oskamp & Klienke, 1970; Shaw & Thorslund, 1975; see Shaw, 
1972, for a review), effects of commitment to future interaction 
(Slusher, Roering, & Rose, 1974), the ability to reward or punish 
the other player for desirable or undesirable responses (Bedell & 
Sistrunk, 1975a, 1975b), the perceived status of the other player 
(Mack, 1976), the effects of modelling (Braver & Barnett, 1976), 
the relationship between motives and reward level (Friedland, Ar-
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nold, & Thibault, 1974), and perceived similarity and friendship 
(Krauss, 1966; McClintock, Nuttin, & McNeel, 1970; McNeel & Reed, 
1975; Oskamp & Perlman, 1965). 
The situational variable of communication has been found to 
increase cooperative responding in gaming situations (Cheney, 
Harford, & Solomon, 1972; Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; 
Scodel, Minas, Ratoosh, & Lipetz, 1959; Grandberg, Stevens & Katz, 
1975). However, these findings have not been invariant. It ap-
pears that communication has different effects which depend on such 
variables as (a) timing of communication (Krauss & Deutsch, 1966; 
Marwell, Schmitt, & Shotola, 1971; Voiseem & Sistrunk, 1971), (b) 
communication medium (Chapanis, 1971; Flint, Harris, & Rector, Note 
2; Vitz & Kite, 1970; Wichman, 1970), (c) communication credibility 
(Benton, 1972; Gahagan & Tedeschi, 1968), and (d) communication 
content (Swensson, 1967; Wyer & Polen, 1971). 
Strategy of the Other in Prisoner's Dilemma Games 
All studies reported in this section involved the use of 
the standard Prisoner's Dilemma game in assessing the effects of 
the programmed strategy of the other. A programmed strategy may 
fall into one of three categories: (a) pure noncontingent strate-
gies, (b) randomized noncontingent strategies, or (c) contingent 
strategies. A randomized noncontingent strategy is one in which 
the programme delivers a particular percentage of cooperative res-
ponses (C responses) over a number of randomly selected trials. 
A pure noncontingent strategy delivers either 100% or 0% C respon-
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ses over the course of the game. A contingent strategy is a stra-
tegy which depends upon the responses of the real player in deter-
mining the responses of the programmed opponent. 
Oskamp (1971) reported six studies in which the 100% C 
strategy was compared to the 0% C strategy. All studies in-
dicated that 100% C produced substantially more concurrent coopera-
tive responding than 0% C. Differences were significant for Sermat 
(1967) and Wilson (1969), very large but significance was not re-
ported for Lave (1965) and Harford and Solomon (1967) , and moderate 
in size but significance not reported for Scodel (1962) and Solomon 
(1960) who used sequential play. Studies which have compared 
extreme levels of randomized cooperation have found significant 
concurrent differences in the same direction as the 100% C and 
0% C comparison (e.g., Heller, 1967; Knapp & Podell, 1968; Lynch, 
1968; Shure & Meeker, 1968) with the exception of a study by 
Bixenstine, Potash, and Wilson (1963) who, by allowing their 
participants 10 free play warm-up trials may have obscured any 
strategy effects. In the study by Knapp and Podell (1968) part-
icipants were given 24 trials of 50% C before changing to a very 
high or low level of programmed cooperative responding and, as 
mentioned, they found a significant strategy effect, possibly 
because the change in the percentage of cooperation was notice-
able to participants. One study (Lave, 1965) compared 100% C 
to 20% C: The 100% C strategy produced significantly more 
cooperative responding. 
The studies presented above indicate that when two strate-
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gies with highly discrepant percentages of cooperative responding 
are compared, the highly cooperative strategy produced more coopera-
tive responding on the part of the participants than the highly un-
cooperative strategy. 
A tit-for-tat strategy is a contingent matching strategy 
which matches on trial n, the participant's response on trial 11 -
1. A number of studies has compared the behaviour of participants 
in a tit-far-tat strategy condition to those in one of various non-
contingent strategy conditions. The exception to the rule is a 
study by Wilson (1971) in which the tit-for-tat strategy was com-
pared to variations on a tit-for-tat theme. The tit-for-tat 
strategy produced the highest level of cooperative responding. 
Studies in which the conditional tit-for-tat strategy was compared 
to noncontingent strategies are presented here to demonstrate that, 
in Prisoner's Dilemma games, the tit-for-tat strategy evoked more 
cooperative responding than noncontingent strategies, even when 
the noncontingent strategy involved a comparable number of coopera-
tive choices. 
In sequential play situations in which the real player must 
choose first on each trial, the tit-for-tat strategy has been 
found to produce significantly greater cooperative responding than 
either 100% C or 90% C strategies and also 0% C or 10% C strategies 
(Solomon, 1960; Oskamp, 1974; Whitworth & Lucker, 1969). In sim-
ultaneous play situations, the tit-for-tat strategy has produced 
significantly more cooperative responding than 0%, C (Crumbaugh & 
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Evans, 1967; Wilson, 1969) but was not significantly different 
(although in the expected direction) in effects from a 100% C stra-
tegy (Oskamp & Perlman, 1965; Wilson, 1969). However, the tit-
for-tat strategy produced more cooperative responding than a 100% 
C strategy for participants characterized by own gain maximiza-
tion (accumulating as many points for oneself as possible) versus 
relative gain maximization (accumulating points in excess of 
those of the opponent) as their central goal (Kuhlman & Marshello, 
1975b; Oskamp, 1971). 
These studies do not permit a statement that a conditional 
strategy is likely to produce more cooperative responding than a 
noncontingent strategy because the overall frequency of coopera-
tive responding differs among the various strategies. 
The problem can be overcome by the use of a yoked control 
design in which one group of participants plays against a tit-for-
tat strategy. The "yoked" group receives a cooperative or non-co-
operative response when the tit-for-tat programmed strategy de-
livers such a response to the first group. Hence, in the first 
group, the programme's responses are contingent upon the behavior 
of the real player while in the yoked control group, these choices 
are not contingent. 
A number of studies has demonstrated that the contingent 
tit-for-tat strategy produced significantly more cooperative res-
ponding than a noncontingent strategy having the same level of 
programmed cooperative responding (Crumbaugh & Evans, 1967; 
Downing et al., 1975; Downing & Ritter, Note 3). Other studies 
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also confirm the tendency of a tit-for-tat strategy to facilitate 
the development of cooperative responding when other variables 
interact at particular levels (Kahn et al., 1971; McNeel, 1973). 
For example, McNeel (1973) did find a contingency effect in the 
proportion of his sample characterized by own gain versus relative 
gain maximization as their central goal. 
The results of the above studies demonstrate conclusively 
that the level of cooperative responding produced by participants 
is influenced by whether or not the programme is contingent. It 
is possible that a sense of control over the programmed other's 
responses is instrumental in the production of higher levels of 
cooperative responding on the part of participants. It may also 
be possible that the participants are attempting to maximize their 
gains: The cooperative response has been shown to be the rational 
choice against a tit-for-tat strategy (Downing, 1975; Downing et 
al., 1975). 
In the present study, a major factor of interest was the 
stability of the respective effects of three strategies when pre-
ceded by a particular strategy during the first half of the game. 
Delayed strategy studies are the prime source of data which indicate 
that previous experience against a particular level of cooperative 
responding on the part of the simulated other influences behaviour. 
However, studies of concurrent strategy effects also provide rele-
vant information as to these effects. 
In terms of concurrent effects of strategies with changing 
cooperation levels either over the course of a game (Amnon Rapoport 
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& Mowshowitz, 1966) or after a number of trials (Bixenstine & 
Wilson, 1963; Swingle, 1968; Swingle & Gillis, 1968) it has been 
found that a change in programmed cooperation from a low to a high 
level produced more cooperative responding than the reverse se-
quence or no change in programmed cooperation. In delayed stra-
tegy studies such effects' have also been noted for 0% C changing 
to 100% C versus a solely 100% C strategy (Scodel, 1962) and for 
a solely 4% C strategy versus strategies which change from 4% C to 
higher levels (Swingle & Coady, 1967). 
In a study by Smith et al. (1975), male and female partici-
pants played a 60 trial Prisoner's Dilemma game consisting of 10 
pretreatment trials against either an 80% C or 20% C programmed 
other, followed by 50 trials of within-trial tit-for-tat (the 
programme matches the participant's response on the same trial.) 
On the final 50 trials, both male and female participants were 
more cooperative after having played against the 80% C versus 20% 
C pretreatment. The data also indicated that when the initial few 
trials were programmed cooperatively, cooperative responding by the 
participants increased at a significantly greater rate than when 
the initial few trials were predominantly competitively programmed. 
This study is not directly comparable to the results of the above 
studies because the 80% C pretreatment followed by a within-trial 
tit-for-tat is not equivalent to a high - low sequence of programmed 
cooperation. 
Harford and Hill (1967) and Harford and Solomon (1967) have 
found that a "reformed sinner" stategy (0% C, then tit-for-tat) 
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produced significantly more delayed cooperative responding in 
Prisoner's Dilemma games than a "lapsed saint" strategy (100% C, 
then tit-for-tat) for up to 20 trials but the effect has been shown 
to dissipate when the tit-for-tat strategy is continued for 60 
trials or more (Oskamp, 1970; Sermat, 1967). This lack of differ-
ences after pretreatment between the final tit-for-tat strategies 
suggests that the concurrent effects of such a strategy override 
the delayed effects of previous strategies, particularly when the 
final period of programmed tit-for-tat responding is prolonged. 
In addition, no significant differences have been reported between 
solely tit-for-tat strategies and reformed sinner strategies 
(Crumbaugh & Evans, 1967; Harford & Hill, 1967; Sermat, 1967). 
Threat in Two-Person Conflict Situations 
Social conflicts often involve the exchange of explicit or 
tacit threats. An explicit threat is one which is specific with 
regard to the course of action the recipient or target must take 
to avoid punishment and to the magnitude of the punishment exacted 
for noncompliance. This type of threat may be operationally de-
fined as an if-then statement (Kelley, 1965) usually communicated 
in the form of a message. A typical threat message in research 
using the Prisoner's Dilemma game reads, "If you do not make Choice 
1 on the next trial, I will take 10 points from your total." Be-
havioural compliance consists of the recipient making the designa-
ted choice on post-message trials as required by the source of the 
threat. 
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The effectiveness of explicit threats in producing compliance 
has been shown to be a function of the cost of threat enforcement 
(Mogy & Pruitt, 1974), the status of the threatener (Faley & 
Tedeschi, 1971), threat credibility (Horai & Tedschi, 1969; Nacci 
and Tedeschi, 1973), the distribution of the power to punish (Ber-
kowitz, Hylander, & Bakaitis, 1973; Michener & Cohen, 1973), the 
magnitude of the threatened punishment (Bonoma & Tedeschi, 1973j 
Tedeschi, Bonoma, & Brown, 1971), the choice behaviour of the source 
(Bonoma & Tedeschi, 1973; Horai & Tedeschi, 1975), the wording of 
the threat message (Schlenker, Bonoma, Tedeschi, & Pivnick, 1970), 
and knowledge of the threatener's prior experience with another 
player (Michelini, 1975). 
The behaviour of the threatener has been shown to be affected 
by target compliance (Monteverde, Paschke, & Tedeschi,1974; 
Tedeschi, Bonoma,& Lindskold, 1970), whether the target can also 
threaten and retaliate (Tedeschi, Bonoma,& Novinson, 1970), the 
cost of the use of threat (Tedeschi, Horai, Lindskold, & Faley, 
1970), the magnitude of retaliation (Lindskold, Bennet, & Wayner, 
1976) and whether the threatener is a group or an individual 
(Lindskold, McElwain & Wayner, 1977). 
Tacit threats are communicated by the actual sequence of 
choices in a gaming situation. Hence an individual involved in 
a game may, through his choice behaviour, punish the other in an 
attempt to reach his desired goal. The Deutsch and Krauss (1960, 
1962) Trucking game is an example of a social conflict situation 
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in which threat is of a tacit nature. Each player is told that 
he or she is the operator of a trucking company with the goal of 
delivering goods to a destination. Operating costs are assessed 
on the basis of time taken to deliver these goods. Conflict be-
tween, players is generated from the layout of available delivery 
routes, the shortest and most lucrative route being a one-lane 
road which only one truck may use at a time. Threats may be intro-
duced into the paradigm by providing gates to the players. These 
gates may be lowered to prevent the other from using the shorter 
one-lane road to reach his destination. Borah (1963) and Kelley 
(1965) have stated that this operational definition of the concept 
of threat is unsatisfactory: The gates may be used to punish the 
opponent, to trick him, to administer revenge, or to signal whose 
turn it is to use the fastest route. 
Like the effectiveness of explicit threat, the effective-
ness of tacit threat also depends upon a number of variables in-
cluding the threatener's satisfaction with payoffs (Frenkel, cited 
in Rapoport et al., 1976; Guyer & Rapoport, 1972), the magnitude 
of the penalty the threatener can inflict (Guyer & Rapoport, 1972), 
and the cost of threat usage (Guyer & Gordon, cited in Rapoport et 
al., 1976). These studies will be reported in more detail in the 
section dealing with empirical studies of threat-vulnerable games. 
Theorists differ in their estimation of the effects of threat 
availability on behaviour in strategic interactions. Deterrent 
and anti-deterrent (escalation of conflict views) of threat have 
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been subjected to experimental investigation. Deutsch and Krauss 
(1960, 1962) suggest that threat availability decreases the level 
of cooperation as measured by the magnitude of players' joint 
payoffs (welfare outcome). Hornstein (1965) showed that the use 
of unambiguous contingent threats in a real-estate game reduced 
the likelihood of agreement. Other studies indicate no such 
relationship (Black & Higbee, 1973; Meeker, Shure, & More, 1964; 
Shomer, Davis, & Kelley, 1966; Tedeschi, 1970). Whether the 
availability of explicit threat does or does not exacerbate con-
flict is a moot question due to findings which have indicated that 
an interaction exists between threat availability and communication 
availability. Both Smith and Anderson (1975) in a Deutsch and 
Krauss type game and Nardin (1968) in an expanded Prisoner's 
Dilemma game have demonstrated that tacit threat is detrimental 
to cooperation when communication is permitted but not when commun-
ication is prohibited. Santi and Wells (1975) investigated the 
effects of communication opportunity (forced, optional, or no 
communication) on behaviour in a 2 X 2 game in which tacit threats 
were transmitted via choices. Results indicated that the commun-
ication variable did not significantly affect game-playing behaviour. 
The present study is concerned with a situation in which 
threat is always available to the programmed opponent. When this 
is the case, it is possible to assess the effects of the use or 
non-use of this form of power. 
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Studies of Non-Use of Power 
A general term to describe the opponent's strategy in all of 
the studies to be presented in this section is "passivity." The 
range of studies in which passivity has been examined is broad, as 
are the operational definitions of the term. Studies include both 
field and gaming experiments. Most studies indicate that pacifist 
behaviour should not be recommended as a means for avoiding conflict 
and increasing cooperation (see Ofshe, 1971, for a theoretical re-
view) . 
A large body of literature concerned with pacifism has used 
gaming situations rather than 2 X 2 games as the primary experi-
mental tool. For example, Shure, Meeker and Hansford (1965) had 
participants play against a totally passive simulated opponent in 
an experimental situation in which either player could achieve an 
initial advantage and proceed to continually dominate the situation. 
The player who did so could receive a large payoff indefinitely 
if he chose not to reciprocate the pacifist's initially cooperative 
behaviour. Both could shock the other for undesirable responses. 
The pacifist, however, never used the shock mechanism but did 
block the participant's goal responses and forced him to use vio-
lent means to acquire the payoff. In one condition, the pacifist's 
nonviolent intentions and anti-violence background (Quaker) were 
communicated to participants. In another, the pacifist actually 
disarmed himself by the non-use of actions which could acquire for 
him the opportunity to both dominate and shock the participants. 
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This guaranteed that no reprisal would occur. The effectiveness 
of the pacifist strategy was not impressive. The percentage of 
participants who initially indicated a willingness to cooperate 
was 48%. By the end of the experiment, the percentage of partici-
pants actually cooperating (taking turns in the use of a limited 
message transmitter) was 39%. The total number of participants 
who cooperated was not affected by a clarification of the pacifist's 
intentions of disarmament. It can be concluded that a simulated 
pure pacifist strategy in such a game does not induce high levels 
of cooperation on the part of participants. Using similar ex-
perimental situations, other studies have extended the work of Shure 
et al. (1965) to include differences between a shocking and a 
warning pacifist (Vincent & Tindell, 1969), balanced and unbalanced 
conditions in terms of shock ratio (Tindell & Vincent, 1970), and 
availability of shock purchasing power (Vincent & Schwerin, 1971). 
In such an experimental situation used in the above experi-
ments, pacifist strategies have not been effective in the induction 
of cooperation for a number of reasons including the lack of an 
influence channel between the pacifist and an audience which can 
control the other participants (Ofshe, 1971), the use of confederate 
teammates who exerted group pressure on the participants to ex-
ploit the pacifist (Meeker & Shure, 1969), and the features of the 
game itself (the participants took considerable risk in allowing 
the pacifist to dominate). 
Studies which do suggest that a pacifist strategy may be 
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effective include Tedeschi, Bonoma, and Novinson (1970), Dorris 
(1972), Marwell, Schmitt, and Boyeson (1973), and Lindskold et al. 
(1976). 
Tedeschi et al. (1970) found that participants used a 
penalty option more frequently in conditions where a simulated op-
ponent could retaliate than in conditions in which he could not. 
Lindskold et al. (1976) found no significant differences between 
the behaviour of participants playing against a nonretaliatory op-
ponent and those playing against opponents who retaliated at higher 
levels (in terms of points to be taken from the participant's 
total). In other words, the pacifist strategy was no more or no 
less effective than the other strategies. 
A field study by Dorris (1972) is relevant to passivity in 
that pacifists often make moral appeals when in conflict with a 
potential aggressor. The participants were unwitting coin dealers 
who were approached by confederates posing as coin sellers who 
made (a) a moral or neutral appeal; and (b) had either been 
•exploited by or had been fairly treated by a previous dealer. 
Those dealers who had received the moral appeal made higher final 
price offers regardless of the information communicated by the 
seller concerning his treatment by a previous dealer. 
Marwell et al. (1975) found that previous experience against 
an unconditionally cooperative opponent (an opponent who both chose 
to participate in a cooperative vs. an individual task and never 
took points from the participants's total) resulted in the eventual 
34 
cooperation and non-exploitation by 12 out of 13 participants. To 
choose to participate in the cooperative task was more lucrative, 
hence the discrepancy between this and the study by Shure et al. 
(1965). Results were explained in terms of the effect of communi-
cation of pacifist intent via the opponent's choices to work co-
operatively and not to take points from the participant. 
The lesults of the above studies cannot be meaningfully com-
pared because of the lack of standardization between the various 
situations used and the concomitant diversity in the operational 
definition of the concept of passivity. 
Swingle (1970) conducted a study in which it was possible 
to examine one variable under which the non-use of available power 
may differentially invite exploitation. He used three matrices 
which varied the power position of the participant relative to the 
opponent: participant in power, equal power and opponent in power. 
The opponent responded on the basis of an unconditionally coopera-
tive strategy, allowing the player to obtain his highest payoff 
on any single trial. Participants made significantly more exploi-
tative responses when playing against an unconditionally coopera-
tive powerful opponent than when playing against either an uncon-
ditionally cooperative equal or less powerful opponent. These 
results were also supported by Black and Higbee (1973) in conditions 
where no threat-message was available to the male participants. 
Exploitative responses occurred with a significantly greater fre-
quency in the opponent-in-power condition than in the participant-
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in-power condition. The explanation for such behaviour revolves 
around perceptions of the unconditionally cooperative opponent. 
These include the attribution of stupidity to the opponent (Swingle, 
1974), the motivation to exploit a seemingly weak opponent (Lave, 
1965), and the belief that the opponent will hesitate to use a 
high level of power out of fear or guilt about the effects of the 
use of such power (Swingle, 1970). 
Threat-Vulnerable Games: Theoretical Considerations 
Rapoport and Guyer (1966) have presented a taxonomy of two-
person two-choice games in which each player has a strong prefer-
ence-ordering of outcomes. Three members of the class of games 
having a single threat-vulnerable equilibrium appear in Figure 4. 
An equilibrium outcome is one from which neither player can uni-
laterally depart without diminishing his own payoff. With refer-
ence to Game 21 it can be seen that both players have a dominating 
strategy, for regardless of the other's choice, both obtain a larger 
payoff by playing their first choices (Rl or Cl). However, if 
Column were to depart from Cl to C2 while Row remained static, his 
or her payoff would be diminished by 1 unit. Should Row unilater-
ally depart from Rl to R2 while Column remained static, Row would 
also suffer a loss. Equilibrium outcomes in which a player may 
induce but not force the other to shift are called threat-vulnerable 
equilibria. An inducement to shift is said to be present when it 
is to the Column player's advantage to shift rather than to suffer 
the consequences of the Row player's shifting. If, however, after 
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Figure 4. Ordinally Defined Games with Threat-
Vulnerable Equilibria 
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Row shifts it is to Column's advantage to shift, he is said to 
have been forced to shift. 
In Game 21, if both players select their dominating stra-
tegies, the Column player obtains his most preferred outcome (4) 
but the Row player obtains his next-to-least preferred outcome (2). 
The only way in which Row can obtain his most preferred outcome is 
for him to induce Column to choose non-dominantly, (i.e., choose 
C2). Up to this point in our discussion there is no reason why 
Column would respond non-dominantly. But, should Row unilaterally 
do so, Column would receive his next-to-least preferred outcome 
(2). Therefore, Row may obtain his most preferred outcome if Column 
perceives or is persuaded that it is to his advantage to shift 
rather than to suffer the consequences of the Row player shifting. 
It should be pointed out that a unilateral departure by 
Row reduces not only Column's payoff but also his own. For this 
reason a departure by Row may be regarded as the use of threat 
against Column which has a certain cost of execution. It should 
also be noted that once an R2Cl outcome occurs it is not in Column's 
best interest to shift to C2 so as to give Row the opportunity to 
shift to Rl and obtain his most desirable payoff in Rlc2. From 
Column's point of view it is more advantageous for him to appease 
Row by shifting occasionally to C2 from the RlCl outcome rather than 
to suffer through the costly outcomes of R2C1 and R2C2. Therefore 
it can be proposed that Row's threat would be effective only if it 
is not carried out. 
38 
As in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, there is a number of 
dependent variables which can be examined including the probability 
of non-dominant responding (R2 or C2 choices), and stochastic mea-
sures for which descriptive labels have been assigned (Guyer & 
Rapoport, 1970). The stochastic measures in Game 21 are: 
Column: 
p(C2/RlCl) Appeasement or Column's propensity to select his 
non-dominant response on trial n given that both 
players had selected their dominant response on 
trial n - 1. The motivation behind such a shift may 
be to forestall the use of threat by Row or to satisfy 
some standard of fair play. 
p(C2/R2Cl) Capitulation or Column's propensity to select his 
non-dominant response on trial n given that he had 
selected his dominant response previously and Row 
had selected his non-dominant response on trial 
n - 1. 
p(C2/RlC2) Generosity. When Column repeats a C2 choice after 
the RlC2 outcome he is giving Row his largest payoff 
once again. 
p(Cl/R2C2) Doublecross. In shifting to Cl after an R2C2 out-
come Column prevents Row from obtaining the spoils 
of his revolt. 
Row: 
p(R2/RlCl) Revolt o r Row's p ropens i ty to choose non-dominantly 
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given that he and the Column player had chosen their 
dominant responses on trial n - 1. 
p(R2/R2Cl) Persistence refers to Row's propensity to respond 
non-dominantly given that he had previously chosen 
in this way while the Column player had selected 
his dominant response on trial n - 1. 
p(R2/RlC2) Dissatisfaction. Following an RlC2 outcome, Column 
has the opportunity to re-establish the natural out-
come by shifting to Cl, provided Row repeats Rl. 
Therefore, p(R2/RlC2) is the probability that Row 
will not allow the natural outcome to be established, 
hence it is a measure of his dissatisfaction even 
after having received the largest payoff. 
p(R2/R2C2) Distrust. Following an R2C2 outcome, Row has the 
opportunity to obtain his largest payoff by shifting 
to Rl if Column plays C2 again on the next trial. 
For Column to switch to Cl on the next trial would 
re-establish the natural outcome given Row plays 
Rl. Row manifests his distrust by playing R2 again 
so that if Column does shift the outcome R2C1 will 
result: Column receives the decrement in payoff 
immediately rather than on the next trial. 
Very often only four of the above measures are reported 
(appeasement, capitulation, revolt and persistence) because of the 
low frequency of occurrence of Rlc2 and R2C2 outcomes necessary to 
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calculate reliable generosity, doublecross, dissatisfaction and 
distrust measures(e.g., Rapoport et al., 1976, p. 194; Santi & 
Wells, 1975). 
Threat-Vulnerable Games: Empirical Studies 
Participant Variables. Edwards and Gordon (cited in Rapo-
port et al. , 1976) examined the performance of female and mixed 
pairs in Game 19. Rapoport et al. (1976) used male pairs. When 
the performances of male and female players were compared, the 
largest differences involved the sex of the Column player. When 
Column was a woman, both male and female Row players resorted to 
the R2 choice more frequently. Male Column players demonstrated a 
higher frequency of C2 responses than female Column players against 
either a male or female Row player. 
Rapoport et al. (1971) compared the performance of Danish 
and American players in Game 19. American and Danish students 
played 100 times as Row and 100 times as Column on each of three 
different matrices which varied the discrepancy between Row's and 
Column's payoffs at the natural outcome. No systematic differences 
were found in outcome distributions for the three different matrices. 
This finding was explained in terms of a contagion effect: Partici-
pants developed a fixed manner of playing, thereby showing little 
sensitivity to variations in game structure. This contagion effect 
has also been found in the Prisoner's Dilemma game (Rapoport & 
Chammah, 1965). An analysis of conditional propensities generally 
supported the conjecture that Danes are more submissive than Ameri-
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cans in the Underdog role of the game (i.e., as Row): The propen-
sity of American Row players to play R2 following each of the four 
outcomes was larger than that of Danes. As Column players, Ameri-
cans and Danes did not differ with respect to the willingness to 
yield to threat and differed only slightly on the appeasement pro-
pensity: Americans appeased slightly more frequently than Danes. 
It is probable that the behaviour of both Danes and Americans in 
either role of the game was dependent upon the behaviour of the 
other player. However, these effects were not ascertained because 
any one player alternated between playing as Row or as Column. 
Therefore any one player may have adopted a fixed manner of playing 
in either or both roles. 
In a second experiment, each participant played against 
three Column strategies and against three Row strategies. The six 
strategies were fixed (i.e., were not probablistic). Participants 
were therefore able to discern and adjust their counterstrategies 
accordingly. Such strategies are more likely to make participants 
aware that their opponent is programmed to respond in a patterned 
manner. For example, Row's strategies were as follows: 
(a) "Passive" strategy: 100% Rl 
(b) "Modest" strategy: The programme used R2 only after 
three consecutive Cl choices by the 
participant. The programme then 
remained with R2 until the parti-
cipant shifted to C2 at which time 
it shifted to Rl. 
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(c) "Demanding" strategy: The programme used Rl only 
after a C2 choice, and always 
used R2 after a Cl choice on 
the part of the participant. 
When fixed strategies are used, differences can be explained 
in terms of differences in discerning the optimal counterstrategies. 
American students tended to play closer to the prescribed optimal 
strategies than the Danish students. 
Sequences in the initial experiment in which bona fide 
players chose Rl or Cl consistently for 100 trials were examined 
to determine their effects, under the assumption that, because 
such extreme strategies occurred only occasionally, participants 
were not likely to falsely assume that they were playing a programmed 
opponent. Results supported those of the initial experiment: Danes 
tended to play submissively in the Underdog role of the game and 
also tended to exploit a passive Underdog more than Americans did. 
These differences were not noted in the second experiment which 
suggests that when participants are relatively sure that the op-
ponent is indeed another person, differences in behaviour are mani-
fested. Participants were not matched on other variables, such 
as grade point average, hence there is considerable difficulty in 
ascribing the observed differences to nationality alone. 
Structural Variables. Of the three threat-vulnerable games, 
only Games 19 and 21 have been used as research tools. Four studies 
will be presented in this section. These studies have relied pre-
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dominantly on descriptive presentation of very large amounts of 
data and have not included statistical tests of significance. 
Rapoport et al. (1976) compared outcome frequencies and 
stochastic measures between the two games. These games differ 
only in the position of Row's next-to-most and next-to-least 
preferred payoffs. With respect to outcome frequencies, the two 
games were very similar. In 9 out of 10 pairs, "Row had to work 
for his share at about the same rate, that is, to resort to R2 
about 15 to 30 percent of the time" (p. 191). 
Interpretation of the stochastic measures is identical for 
the two games. In both games, the following rank ordering of 
Row's propensity of playing R2 obtained: p(R2/R2C2)> p(R2/R2Cl)> 
p(R2/RlC2)>p(R2/RlCl). However the difference between the two 
game matrices did modify the mean values of p(R2/R2C2) and p(R2/RlCl) 
appropriately: "Revolts" were tower in Game 19 (.11) than in Game 
21 (.15) because an Rl choice in Game 19 may result in a higher 
payoff than in Game 21. The propensity p(R2/R2c2) was higher 
in Game 21 (.56) than in Game 19 (.41) because an R2 choice in 
Game 21 may result in a higher payoff than in Game 19. The rank 
ordering of Column's propensities differed between the two games. 
In Game 19, the following rank ordering obtained: p(C2/R2C2)> 
p(C2/RlC2)> p(C2/RlCl)> p(C2/R2Cl). In game 21, the first and 
second propensities were reversed in order, as were the third and 
fourth. Since Column's payoff are identical in both magnitude 
and position in both these games, the reversal could not be 
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satisfactorily explained. The authors suggested that the reversal 
may be a consequence of an indirect effect, i.e., the difference 
in Row's payoff structure between the two games. The difference 
in the mean values of p(C2/R2C2) was considered to be relatively 
meaningless in view of the fact that the outcome R2C2 occurred 
very infrequently in both Game 19 and Game 21 (a mean frequency of 
3 and 4 trials, respectively, in a 100 trial game). This study 
indicated that the results of experiments using Game 19 or Game 21 
are comparable and that the frequency with which a choice is re-
peated is related to the rank of the associated payoff. 
The effects of payoff magnitudes have been examined in 
Game 21. Making one choice per presented matrix theoretically 
reflects the decision of a rational player because he or she is 
not susceptible to patterns of reward or punishment which are 
inherent in iterated games. To vary the particular game and the 
relative magnitude of payoffs within each game would supposedly 
aid in identifying the relative weight with which game theoretical 
factors contribute to the strategy choices observed in iterated 
games. 
Guyer and Rapoport (cited in Rapoport et al., 1976) varied 
three dimensions in Game 21: (a) Row's dissatisfaction with the 
natural outcome, (b) Row's threat to Column, and (c) Row's cost of 
threat usage. Row's dissatisfaction was varied by increasing the 
discrepancy between his and Column's payoff in the RlCl outcome 
quadrant. Row's threat to Column was varied by increasing the 
discrepancy between Column's payoff in the RlCl outcome and Column's 
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payoff should Row choose R2 while Column remained static. Major 
findings included: (a) the more "satisfied" Row was, the greater 
the percentage of Rl and Cl responses by the Row and Column players 
respectively; (b) the lower the magnitude of Row's threat to 
Column, the greater the percentage of Cl choices by Column; and 
(c) when the cost of threat usage to Row was high, the percentage 
of R2 responses by Row decreased. These observations generally 
indicated that choice behaviour varies as a function of payoff 
magnitudes usually in the expected direction. 
Guyer and Gordon (cited in Rapoport et al. , 1976) examined 
the performance of 18 pairs of participants in 100 trial games, 
including Game 19. As in the single play experiment, payoff changes 
in iterated games do modify choice frequencies. Stochastic measures 
were also shown to vary as a function of changes in payoff magni-
tudes. The direction, magnitude and explanation of such changes 
in game-playing behaviour as measured by either choice frequencies 
or conditional probabilities has yet to be drawn into a cohesive 
body of literature, most likely because of the difficulty in assi-
milating contradictory findings into an empirically derived model 
of behaviour. 
Situational Variables. Guyer and Rapoport (1970) investiga-
ted the performance of 10 pairs of male undergraduates in Game 21. 
The matrix used in presented as Variant 2 in Figure 5. This study 
is presented here in order to facilitate a comparison with the 
subsequent Santi and Wells (1975) study in which the two indepen-
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dent variables were situational and structural in nature. The 
game was played for 300 trials. Two questions were of prime im-
portance: (a) Does Row use his threat option against Column (R2) 
in attempting to gain his (Row's) most preferred payoff in the 
outcome RlC2, and (b) is this use of threat by Row successful in 
obtaining concessions from Column (a C2 choice)? The mean percen-
tage of each of the four possible outcomes indicated that Row 
does carry out his threat and that Column does depart from the Cl 
choice: The mean combined percentages of the outcomes R2C1 and 
R2C2 and the outcomes RlC2 and R2C2 were 13% and 28% respectively. 
A high correlation between the frequency of RlC2 and R2Cl outcomes, 
r = +.83, p<. 05, suggested that the use of the R2 choice by Row 
may be successful in gaining concessions from Column. However, 
RlC2 outcomes occurred more than twice as frequently as R2Cl out-
comes (24% vs. 9% respectively) suggesting that appeasement also 
played a role in Column's conoession-making behaviour because 
Column is making C2 responses in excess of those "demanded" by the 
use of R2 by Row. 
Conditional probabilities also provided data relevant to the 
two primary questions. The conditional propensity, p(R2/RlCl), 
or the likelihood that Row will carry out a threat against Column, 
was .10. The likelihood that Column would appease Row, p(C2/RlCl), 
was .12. The likelihood that Column would capitulate to Row's 
threat, p(C2/R2Cl), was .23. Evidently, Row does occasionally use 
threat and Column does make concessions in the form of appeasement 
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or capitulation. The correlations between Row's likelihood of 
using threat, p(R2/RlCl), and Column's likelihood of appeasement, 
p(C2/RlCl), indicated that the more likely Row was to use threat, 
the more likely Column was to appease, £ = +.69, j><.05. Also, 
the more likely Row was to use threat, the more likely Column was 
to capitulate, p(C2/R2Cl), r = +.96, p <.01. 
Santi and Wells (1975) have also supplied data relevant to 
the effect of Row's behaviour on Column. One hundred and eighty 
male participants played 125 trials of Game 21 on one of three 
matrices which varied Row's threat to Column by increasing the dis-
crepancy between Column's payoff at the RlCl outcome and his pay-
off should Row choose R2 while Column remained static. The three 
variants are presented in Figure 5. Row's threat to Column is 
highest in Variant 1 and lowest in Variant 3. Three communication 
conditions (forced, optional and no communication) constituted a 
second independent variable. This variable did not significantly 
affect gaming behavior. 
However, significant variant effects were found. Row's 
probability of playing an R2 response decreased significantly, 
p<.001, from Variant 1 (approximately .60) to Variant 2 (appro-
ximately .42) to Variant 3 (approximately .27). Row's propensity 
to revolt, p(R2/RlCl), and to persist, p(R2/R2Cl), and Column's 
propensity to appease, p(C2/RlCl), also decreased significantly, 
P_'sC.05 as Row's threat to Column decreased. With respect to the 
appeasement propensity, Variants 1 and 2 differed from 3, p<.05, 
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but not from each other: Appeasement was greater in variants with 
high or moderate threat than in a variant with low threat. Thus, 
predictably, when there was substantial cost to Column when Row 
carries out a threat, Column was more likely to choose his non-
dominant response after and RlCl outcome more frequently as the use 
of threat by Row increased. It would appear at first glance that 
Column was indeed susceptible to changes in the magnitude of Row's 
threat (noted by Guyer & Rapoport, 1972). An alternative explana-
tion may be that Column's behaviour was in part a function of the 
Row player's responses to the changes in payoff magnitude. 
This interdependence of behaviour is further highlighted by 
a comparison of the Guyer and Rapoport (1970) and Santi and Wells 
(1975) studies. Any meaningful comparison must be performed on 
the differences in behaviour on Variant 2 (no communication condi-
tion) of the Santi and Wells experiment. Variant 2 is identical 
to the matrix used by Guyer and Rapoport, therefore permitting a 
comparison of the performance of players across the two studies. 
In the Guyer and Rapoport study, Row selected Rl on 86% of the 
trials whereas in the Santi and Wells study, Row did so on 47% of 
the trials. In view of these differences, it might be' expected that 
Column's behaviour would be substantially different. However, in 
both studies, Column chose his dominant strategy (Cl) on 70% of 
the trials and capitulated, p(C2/R2Cl), with a propensity of .23. 
The largest difference in behaviour occurred with respect to the 
appeasement propensity, p(C2/RlCl). In the Santi and Wells 
(1975) study, the propensities for revolt and appeasement were 
.42 and .41 respectively. In the Guyer and Rapoport (1970) 
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study, these propensities were .10 and .12. It appears that the in-
dex of behaviour most affected by changes in Row's behaviour is the 
appeasement propensity. Is Column appeasing more frequently because 
Row's behaviour differs between the two studies or do other var-
iables account for the difference? Neither study singularly or in 
comparison with the other yields a definitive conclusion concern-
ing the effect of one player's behaviour upon the other. To draw 
such a conclusion requires that the behaviour of one player be 
placed under experimental control such that evidence for causality, 
if any, can be gathered. 
Guyer and Gordon (cited in Rapoport et al., 1976) reported 
such an experiment, using Game 19, in which the behaviour of parti-
cipants was investigated as a function of three Row strategies and 
three Column strategies. Eighteen pairs of participants played a 
100 trial game in each of the following conditions: 
(a) as Row against Column's 
1. "Adamant" strategy: 100% Cl 
2. "Tight" strategy: p(Cl/a single Rl) = .75 
p(Cl/a single R2) = 1.00 
In this strategy Column indicates a willingness 
to share voluntarily but refuses to shift to C2 
after Row uses R2. 
3. "Semi-yielding" strategy: p(Cl/a single Rl) = 1.00 
p(Cl/a single R2) = .50 
p(C2 a single R2) = .50 
Column refuses to share voluntarily but will shift 
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to C2 after Row uses R2 with a probability of .50. 
(b) as Column against Row's 
1. "Passive" strategy: 100% Rl 
2. "Modest" strategy: 
p(Rl/a single Cl) = 1.00 
p(Rl/two consecutive Cl's) = .75 
p(R2/two consecutive Cl's) = .25 
p(Rl/three consecutive Cl's) = .50 
p(R2/three consecutive Cl's) = .50 
p(R2/four or more Cl's) = 1.00 
p(Rl/C2) = 1.00 
This strategy reflects a gradual increase in Row's 
propensity to select R2 as the number of Cl choices 
increases. 
3. "Demanding" strategy 
p(Rl/a s ingle Cl or C2) = 1.00 
p(Rl/two consecutive Cl 's) = .50 
p(R2/two consecutive Cl ' s ) = .50 
p(R2/three or more consecutive Cl 's) = 1.00 
Row manifests a more rapid increase in 
the select ion of R2. 
Five matr ices, presented in Figure 6, were used to assess 
the effects of changes in Row's sa t i s fac t ion with the RlCl outcome 
and Row's cost of threat usage. Row's sa t i s fac t ion was manipulated 
by increasing the discrepancy between Row's and Column's payoff at 
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the RlCl outcome (Varants 1, 2 and 3). Cost of threat usage was 
manipulated by altering Row's payoff at the R2Cl outcome (Var-
iants 4 and 5). None of the following results was subjected to 
tests of significance. 
The effects of Column's strategies on the probability of non-
dominant reponding were slight. The mean probabilities of R2 res-
ponding taken across all variants were .21, .20, and .24 for each 
of the adamant, tight and semi-yielding strategies respectively. 
The tight strategy evoked less persistence, p(R2/R2Cl), than the 
adamant strategy in Variants 1, 2 and 3. Therefore, Guyer and 
Gordon surmise that the reduced probability of R2 responses against 
the tight strategy is attributable to the reduced probability of 
persistence rather than to a reduced unconditional frequency 
of R2. The probability that Row would revolt, p(R2/R2Cl) was 
larger in Variants 1, 2 and 3, against the tight strategy than 
against the adamant strategy (.12 vs. .06 respectively), despite 
the fact that an R2 choice is completely ineffective against both 
these strategies. Guyer and Rapoport suggest that Row may believe 
that Column's occasional sharing in the tight strategy condition 
is a result of his (Row's) own occasional resort to threat. The 
structural manipulation affected the probability of R2 responding 
consistently: Regardless of the programmed strategy, the probability 
of R2 responding increased as Row became more dissatisfied and 
decreased as the cost of threat usage became excessive. 
The effects of Row's strategies on Column form a less con-
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voluted picture. The probability of C2 responding was lower against 
Row's passive strategy than against Row's modest and demanding stra-
tegies (.16, .28 and .29 respectively). The results are most clear 
with respect to Column's tendency to appease the Row player, 
p(C2/RlCl). Across all variants, Row's modest and demanding stra-
tegies evoked a higher mean probability of such responses than the 
passive strategy (.45, .46 and .21 respectively). There was little 
difference in the mean probability of C2 responding after the R2Cl 
outcome (capitulation) between Row's modest and demanding stra-
tegies. Evidently, Column's behaviour does differ as a function 
of Row's strategies, especially with regard to voluntary sharing 
behaviour. 
These results are similar to those of Gruder and Duslak 
(1973) in which the severity of retaliation was manipulated struc-
turally. The study was designed to eliminate those procedural fea-
tures of previous studies of the effectiveness of pacifist stra-
tegies (e.g., Shure et al., 1965) which may have encouraged parti-
cipants to be extremely competitive. The threat-vulnerable game 
used in the experiment is displayed in Figure 7. Participants 
played against one of three programmed strategies: (a) nonretalia-
tory, (b) low retialiatory, and (c) high retaliatory. A nonretalia-
tory opponent chose Row 1 on every trial thereby leaving himself 
open to exploitation by the participant (who could consistently 
choose Cl). The opponent never used the potential threat inherent 
in the matrix by which he could lower Column's payoff by 20 points 
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Figure 7. Mixed-Motive Threat-Vulnerable 
Game (Gruder & Duslak, 1973) 
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and possibly induce Column to play C2. The low retialiatory oppon-
ent chose Rl unless the participant chose Cl more than once conse-
cutively, in which case R3 was chosen until the player shifted to C2. 
The simulated opponent thereby reduced his own and Column's payoffs 
for failure to alternate between Cl and C2 choices. Such alter-
nating behaviour represented non-exploitative behaviour. In the 
high retaliatory condition, the programme substituted R2 for R3 in 
the low retaliatory strategy. Therefore Column's failure to alter-
nate reduced his total point payoff by'5 points. At first glance 
it would appear that the low and high retaliatory strategies did 
not differ in the frequency of retaliation but did differ in the 
severity of threat (R2 vs. R3 choices). No data were presented to 
determine whether the two strategies in practice did differ in the 
frequency of retaliatory choices. Of course, these two strategies 
did differ in the frequency of retaliation from the nonretaliatory 
strategy. The measure of cooperation was the number of times the 
participant chose C2. Results indicated that the low retaliatory 
strategy elicited more cooperative responding than the high retalia-
tory strategy, which elicited more than the nonretaliatory strategy. 
These differences increased over trials. A second experiment was 
conducted in which the severity of retaliation (low or high, as 
manipulated structurally), and the presence of retaliation ware 
the two variables. As in Experiment 1, results indicated that no 
retaliation elicits fewer cooperative responses than either the 
high or low retaliatory strategies. 
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In summary, both the Gruder and Duslak (1973) and the Guyer 
and Gordon (cited in Rapoport et al*, 1976) experiments indicated 
that when the effects of a passive noncontingent strategy were com-
pared to those of a contingent more demanding strategy in threat-
vulnerable games, the former strategy produced a lower frequency of 
non-dominant responding and, in the latter study, a lower propensity 
to share voluntarily (appease). Therefore these two strategies 
differed with respect to both the frequency and contingency of threat, 
making statements about the effects of threat frequency alone tenuous. 
Overview of Experimental Design 
Guyer and Rapoport (1970) did indicate that the behaviour of 
either a Row or a Column player in Game 21 is influenced by the 
behaviour of their opponent. The comparison between this and the 
Santi and Wells (1975) study suggested that a change in the be-
haviour of the Row player may be suspected as having an effect on 
the behaviour of the Column player, particularly as measured by 
the appeasement propensity, p(C2/RlCl). 
The effect of the Row player's behaviour on the Column 
player's behaviour was investigated by Gruder and Duslak (1973) and 
by Guyer and Gordon (cited in Rapoport et al,, 1976) who, by placing 
the frequency of threat usage by Row under experimental control, 
demonstrated that the probability of non-dominant responding by 
Column is higher against a Row player who uses threat than against 
one who does not. The probability of making a C2 response after 
an RlCl outcome (appeasement) was also shown to be higher against 
a more demanding Row player (Guyer & Gordon, cited in Rapoport et 
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al., 1976). In both these studies, the passive (100% Rl strategy) 
was noncontingent in contrast to the more demanding strategies. 
In view of previous Prisoner's Dilemma game research which indica-
ted that contingent strategies produce more cooperative responding 
than noncontingent strategies, even when the overall level of pro-
grammed cooperative responding is identical (e.g., Crumbaugh & 
Evans, 1967; Downing et al., 1975), it is possible that previously 
observed differences in Column's behaviour as a function of the 
frequency of threat usage by Row, are actually either partially 
or wholly attributable to differences in contingency between the 
Row strategies. 
The primary purpose of the present experiment was to separate 
the respective effects of threat frequency and contingency in a 
threat-vulnerable game. A second purpose was to examine the sta-
bility of these effects when strategies were altered in the final 
75 trials of the game. That is, are the effects stable regardless 
of which strategy was experienced during the initial 75 trials of 
a 150 trial game? To answer these questions, participants played 
against one of nine programmed stragegy sequences; all possible 
pairwise orderings of passive (P), demanding contingent (DC), and 
demanding noncontingent (DNC) strategies. These nine sequences are 
placed into a conceptual framework in Figure 8. "Initial strategy" 
refers to the first 75 trials of a 150-trial game. Cells are 
numbered in order to facilitate later discussion of the pairing 
of cells for the purpose of yoking the demanding strategies. 
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DNC DNC 
P = Passive Strategy 
DC = Demanding Contingent Strategy 
DNC = Demanding Noncontingent Strategy 
Figure 8. Cells in Experimental Design 
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The P strategy consisted of continual Rl responding on the 
part of the programmed opponent. The following response contin-
gencies (as in Guyer and Gordon, cited in Rapoport et al., 1976) 
were operative during the administration of the DC strategy: 
p(Rl/a single Cl or C2) = 1.00 
p(Rl/two consecutive Cl's) = .50 
p(R2/two consecutive C2's) = .50 
p(R2/three or more consecutive Cl's) = 1.00 
The identical response was simultaneously delivered to the parti-
cipants who received the yoked DNC strategy. 
The primary question was whether the frequency of threat 
usage or threat contingency (or both) was the critical determinant 
of Column's choice behaviour. This was addressed by a comparison 
of the first 75 trials of the initial P (cells 1, 2, and 3), 
initial DC (cells 4, 5, and 6), and the initial DNC (cells 7, 8, and 
9) strategies. This was a one-way analysis of concurrent strategy 
effects. 
If threat frequency alone is the prime determinant of 
Column's behaviour, the P strategy should differ significantly in 
its effects from both the DC and DNC strategies which themselves 
should not differ. If this is the case, then the direction of the 
findings were expected to be the same as in the Gruder and Duslak 
(1973) and the Guyer and Gordon (cited in Rapoport et al., 1976) 
studies: the higher the frequency of threat usage, the higher the 
probability of concessions (probability of non-domiant responding 
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and appeasement) by Column. 
If threat contingency alone is the prime determinant of 
Column's behaviour, the DC strategy should differ significantly 
from both the DNC and P strategies. However, the DNC and P strate-
gies should not differ significantly. The DC strategy was expected 
to evoke a higher probability of concessions from Column than 
either the DNC or P strategies on the basis of the results of 
studies using the Prisoner's Dilemma game which indicated that 
contingent strategies produced more cooperative responding than 
noncontingent strategies having the same overall level of programmed 
cooperation (e.g., Crumbaugh & Evans, 1967). 
If both threat frequency and threat contingency are important 
determinants of Column's behaviour, significant differences were 
expected between all comparisons of the three strategies. If this 
is the case, two possible orderings of the results are DC>DNC^P 
or P^DNC^DC. However, the former ordering is a more likely 
outcome given the previous results of Gruder and Duslak (1973) 
and Guyer and Gordon (cited in Rapoport et al., 1976). The finding 
that both threat frequency and contingency are important deter-
minants of Column's behaviour would offer an explanation as to why 
previous studies have found that demanding strategies produced more 
concessions by Column than passive strategies. 
Lastly, if neither threat frequency nor contingency affect 
Column's behaviour, there should be no significant differences 
1 
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among all comparisons of the three strategies. Such an outcome 
would be most unlikely given that previous studies do indicate 
that passive and demanding strategies differentially affect the 
behaviour of the Column player (Gruder & Duslak, 1973; Guyer & 
Gordon, cited in Rapoport et al., 1976). 
To determine the effects of previous experience with a par-
ticular strategy (P, DC, or DNC) on each of the final strategies, 
the final 75 trials of all cells were compared to one another in 
a 3 (initial strategy) X 3 (final strategy) design. 
If previous experience regardless of the particular initial 
strategy has no effect upon Column's behaviour, comparisons between 
the means of the final strategy conditions should reveal the same 
results as the between participants analyses conducted on the first 
75 trials. However, if the type of initial strategy experienced 
does have an effect upon Column's behaviour which differs as a 
function of the particular final strategy, then a significant 
initial X final strategy interaction should occur. That previous 
experience does affect the behaviour of players has been demon-
strated using the Prisoner's Dilemma game (Harford & Hill, 1967; 
Harford & Solomon, 1967; Smith et al., 1975). No studies have 
examined these effects in threat-vulnerable games. 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety male students enrolled in undergraduate courses at 
Wilfrid Laurier University during the period January to August 
1978, served as participants. They were randomly assigned to the 
nine strategy conditions using a block randomized procedure. 
Ten participants had to be replaced because they or their 
partners (participants were run in pairs) indicated on the post-
experimental questionnaire that they did not accept the experimental 
manipulation. Two such pairs occurred in cell 1. The others were 
unsystematically distributed over three cells. 
Overview of Experimental Situation 
Two participants were seated in separate rooms which 
visually and accoustically isolated them from each other and from 
the experimenter. Each room contained a game console on which 
there were two response buttons, a display window (on which the 
matrix was placed) a counter which automatically recorded the par-
ticipant's own scores, and a "go-light." The label "Player B" 
was placed above each participant's go-light. Each room also con-
tained a tape-recorder. 
In order to yoke the DNC strategy condition to the DC 
strategy condition for either 75 or 150 trials, the following cells 
of the design were run simultaneously: cells 2 and 3, cells 4 and 
7, cells 5 and 9, and cells 6 and 8. All cells were filled at a 
comparable rate. 
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The Game 
Game 21 was used rather than Game 19 in order to investi-
gate the possibility that the U6e of threat and the appeasement 
propensity are positively related (Guyer & Rapoport, 1970; Santi 
& Wells, 1975). This relationship was also indicated by Guyer 
and Gordon (cited in Rapoport et al., 1976). To facilitate com-
parisons between these studies the assignment of payoffs to the 
game as defined by the ordinal ranking of payoffs was identical 
to Guyer and Rapoport (1970) and Variant 2 of the Santi and Wells 
(1975) study. The game matrix is presented in Figure 9. 
Procedure 
As soon as both participants were seated, the experimenter 
individually drew their attention to a typed set of instructions 
and informed each that he could read along as the instructions 
were delivered by the tape-recorder. A transcript of the instruc-
tions can be found in Appendix A. Participants were told that the 
experiment was concerned with "how people make simple decisions in 
a two-person situation which has payoffs." They were also told 
that the payoff depended both "on what you do and what the other 
person does." Following Guyer and Rapoport (1970), all partici-
pants were given an individualistic orientation. They were told, 
"your goal in the game is to make as many points as possible for 
yourself without regard to the number of points earned by the other." 
Lastly, all participants were informed that, "at the end of the 
game, for every 10^ showing on your counter, you will receive lc." 
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Player B 
(Column) 
R1 
Player A 
(Row) 
R2 
Cl 
X. 20 
8 X. 
X. 6 
-2 X,^  
C2 
X 15 
20 X 
^ \ -2 
15 X. 
Figure 9. Game 21 Matrix 
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Participants were probed to ensure that they understood 
the-ramifications of making each choice available dependent upon 
the other's choices. This was accomplished by asking two questions: 
If you make Response 1 and the other person makes Response 
2, how many points do you get. „ . how many points does he get? 
If you make Response 2 and the other person makes Response 
1, how many points do you get . . . how many does he get? 
If a participant answered incorrectly, the experimenter 
repeated the instructions and asked the questions once again. 
Participants were then asked: If your counter reads 1430 
points, how much money will you receive? 
Upon completion of the probe, the game began. The start of 
a trial was indicated by a red go-light. The participant made a 
response by pushing Response 1 or Response 2. The IBSponses of 
both players and the experimenter were recorded by an event recorder. 
Feedback on each trial was provided by a 5 sec illumination of the 
appropriate quadrant of each participant's matrix as determined 
by the joint choices of the individual participant and the experi-
menter. During this 5 sec visual display, the participant's own 
points were automatically accumulated and displayed on a counter. 
There was a 5 sec delay between the termination of feedback and 
the onset of the red go-light. Therefore, the inter-response inter-
val was approximately 11 sec. There were 150 trials of the game. 
Description of Programmed Strategy Sequences 
When a DC strategy for either 75 or 150 trials was to be 
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delivered, the following response contingencies were operative in 
order to conform to the strategy used by Guyer and Gordon (cited 
in Rapoport et al., 1976). 
p(Rl/a single Cl or C2) » 1.00 
p(Rl/two consecutive Cl's) = .50 
p(R2/two consecutive Cl's) = .50 
p(R2/three or more consecutive Cl's) = 1.00 
Programmed responses were delivered on a one-trial lag basis. An 
Rl response was always delivered on trial 1. For example, if on 
trials 1 and 2, Cl responses were made by the participant, the 
probability of an R2 response being delivered on Trial 3 was .50. 
An alternator (Lehigh Valley Electronics, Model No. 241-
05) was used to determine with a 50/50 probability whether an Rl 
or an R2 response was delivered following two consecutive Cl res-
ponses on the part of the participant. The identical response was 
simultaneously delivered to the participant in the DNC yoked group. 
When two players were present who had been assigned to a condition 
receiving the P strategy for either 75 or 150 trials, the experi-
menter delivered continual Rl responses. Six of the nine strategy 
sequences required a change in strategy. This began on trial 76. 
At the end of the game, all participants were given a post-
experimental questionnaire (see Appendix B) which queried each as 
to what he thought of the other player and what he thought the ex-
perimenter was trying to find out in the experiment. Once this had 
been completed the participants were given cash based on their point 
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total. The maximum any one participant could earn was $3.00. This 
amount was attainable only if the player chose Cl on every trial 
against a 150 trial P strategy. Each participant was also asked 
to sign his name and address on an envelope so that at a later date 
he would receive a summary of experimental findings. Care was 
taken to impress upon each participant that the procedure of the 
experiment should not be divulged until he had received the results. 
Results 
All analyses, including tests of simple main effects and 
multiple comparisons were performed on arcsin transformed data. 
This transformation is useful when the means and variances are 
proportional and the observations have a binomial distribution 
(Kirk, 1968; Winer, 1962). Inspection of these data suggested that 
in fact means and variances were proportional. 
Overall Trends in Outcome Frequencies 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the four outcomes for the 
initial strategy conditions. These data were derived solely from 
the first 75 trials of the initial P, DC and DSC cells. Table 2 
shows the distribution of the four outcomes for the three final 
strategy conditions. These tables are presented to provide an 
overview of gross trends in the data. The following presentation 
of these data is intended to serve a descriptive function, the 
importance of any observations being contingent upon subsequent 
statistical tests which appear in later sections. 
Both tables show that the outcomes RlC2 and R2C2 occur infre-
quently regardless of whether these data are derived from the ini-
tial or final strategy conditions. These two outcomes require a C2 
response on the part of the participant. The Cl response appears 
to have been made more frequently as seen in the much higher mean 
percentages of the RlCl and R2Cl outcomes. 
A second trend is also evident: The occurrence of the RlCl 
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Table 1 
Mean Percentages of the Four Outcomes for the 
Initial P, DC, and DNC Strategy Conditions 
Quadrant Outcome 
1 2 3 
Natural Sharing Threat 
(RlCl) (R1C2) (R2C1) 
Concession 
(R2C2) 
P 
DC 
DNC 
84.7 
38.4 
40.6 
15.3 
12.5 
10.3 
38.4 
40.2 
10.7 
8.9 
Note. Quadrants 3 and 4 are undefined for the Passive strategy 
condition. 
Table 2 
Mean Percentages of the Four Outcomes for the 
Final P, DC and DNC Strategy Conditions 
Quadrant Outcome 
1 2 3 
Natural Sharing Threat 
(RlCl) (R1C2) (R2C1) 
Concession 
(R2C2) 
P 89.0 
DC 33.6 
DNC 40.6 
11.0 
18.4 
10.8 
38.8 
41.8 
9.2 
6.8 
Note. Quadrants 3 and 4 are undefined for the Passive strategy 
condition. 
71 
outcome is highest in the P strategy condition followed b> the DNC 
and DC strategy conditions regardless of whether the strategy con-
dition is final or initial. Therefore, the C2 response occurs 
more frequently in the DC strategy condition than in the other two 
strategy conditions. 
Initial Strategy Effects 
The primary analysis of initial strategy effects across the 
first 75 trials was directed toward determining whether one or both 
of threat frequency or threat contingency are important determinants 
of the Column player's behaviour. 
The mean probability of non-dominant responding (C2 respon-
ding) in the three initial strategy conditions is presented in 
Table 3. The mean probability of C2 responding was low in all con-
ditions as reflected previously by the overall trends in outcome 
frequencies. A one-way analysis of variance revealed no significant 
effect of strategy condition, F(2,87) = 2.68, p>.10. 
The probability of non-dominant responding is not as sensi-
tive a measure as the stochastic measures of appeasement, p(C2/RlCl), 
and capitulation, p(C2/R2Cl), which are conditionalized on the RlCl 
and R2C1 outcomes respectively. 
Stochastic measures refer to the probability of a certain 
response occurring on trial n given that a certain outcome had 
occurred on trial n - 1. A general way of symbolizing such a pro-
bability is p(Cl/RlCl). This represents "the probability of a Cl 
response given an RlCl outcome on the previous trial." Precisely 
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations of the 
Probability of Non-Dominant Responding Across Initial 
Strategy Conditions 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
P 
.153 
.187 
Strategy Condition 
DC 
.232 
.135 
DNC 
.192 
.191 
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because these measures are conditionalized they more directly "tap" 
the responses of the Column player to the behaviour of the Row 
player. Four outcomes are possible in any 2 X 2 game. For any one 
stochastic measure to be defined for a player, the frequency of a 
particular quadrant outcome must exceed the criterion number (3 or 
more). It was necessary to estimate conditional probabilities when 
the number of opportunities (i.e., quadrant outcomes) was insuffi-
cient. The mean conditional probability of those Column players for 
whom the number of quadrant outcomes was sufficient was assigned to 
those players for whom the number of quadrant outcomes was insuf-
ficient. The effect of estimation was considered slight. For ex-
ample, only 1/90 observations for the appeasement propensity were 
estimated (1.1%) before the analysis of initial strategy effects 
was performed. Due to the small number of estimations made with 
respect to the appeasement, p(C2/RlCl), and capitulation, p(C2/R2Cl), 
measures, it is unlikely that the concomitant reduction of within-
cell variances resulted in significant positive bias in the analyses 
of variance. 
The very infrequent occurrence of the R1C2 and R2C2 out-
comes which are necessary to obtain reliable estimates of the genero-
sity, p(C2/RlC2), and doublecross, p(Cl/R2c2), propensities made 
estimation prohibitive. During the initial 75 trials, the frequency 
of the R1C2 outcome did not exceed the criterion number for 34 out 
of a total of 90 participants. The frequency of the R2C2 outcome 
did not exceed the criterion number for 15 out of a total of 60 
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participants. Descriptive statistics for these propensities across 
the initial strategy conditions are presented in Appendix C. 
Appeasement propensities, p(C2/RlCl), in the initial stra-
tegy conditions appear in Table 4. A one-way analysis of variance 
revealed a significant effect of initial strategy condition, F(2,87) 
« 8.33, p<.01. A Newman-Keuls test indicated that the propensity 
for appeasement was significantly higher, j>(.05, in the DC stra-
tegy condition than in both the P and DNC strategy conditions which 
themselves did not differ significantly, j>}.05. That the DNC 
strategy condition did not differ significantly from the P stra-
tegy condition is direct evidence that the frequency of threat alone 
is net the prime determinant of the Column player's propensity to 
appease. Rather, the analysis indicates that contingency is the 
prime determinant of the Column player's propensity to appease 
during the initial 75 trials of the game. 
A comparison of the effects of the DC and DNC strategy con-
ditions on the capitulation propensity, p(C2/R2Cl), also tended to 
support the finding that the contingency of threat affects the Col-
umn player's behaviour. Capitulation propensities in the initial 
strategy conditions appear in Table 5. Capitulation is not defined 
for the p strategy. A one-way analysis of variance revealed a sig-
nificant effect of initial strategy condition, F(l,58) = 11.18, 
p^.01. The capitulation propensity was significantly higher in 
the DC strategy condition than in the DNC strategy condition. These 
two strategy conditions differed only in the contingency of threat. 
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Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations of the 
Appeasment Propensity, p(C2/RlCl), Across Initial 
Strategy Conditions 
Strategy Condition 
P DC DNC 
Mean .111 .255 .114 
Standard Deviation .138 .231 .106 
Note. 1.1% of the appeasement data is estimated (1/90 observa-
tions). 
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Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations of the 
Capitulation Propensity, p(c2/R2Cl), Across Initial 
Strategy Conditions 
Strategy Condition 
DC DNC 
Mean .342 .157 
Standard Deviation .234 .163 
Note. 3.3% of the capitulation data is estimated (2/60 observa-
tions). 
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Therefore, the observed difference is attributable to the threat 
contingency variable. 
The results of the analysis of initial strategy effects 
leads to the tentative conclusion that threat contingency alone 
is the prime determinant of the Column player's behaviour, parti-
cularly the propensity to appease. 
Final Strategy Effects 
The purpose of these analyses was to examine the stability 
of the above results when participants have been exposed to the 
various initial strategy conditions treated as treatments. Only 
data derived from the final 75 trials were subjected to analyses. 
The mean probability of C2 responding during the final 75 
trials is presented in Table 6 as a function of both initial and 
final strategy conditions. Regardless of the initial strategy con-
dition, the mean probability of C2 responding was highest in the 
final DC strategy condition followed by the final DNC and P strategy 
conditions in that order. The mean probability of occurrence of 
non-dominant responding associated with the final P, DC and DNC 
strategy conditions were .110, .276, and .176 respectively. A 
3 X 3 analysis of these data revealed a significant main effect of 
final strategy, F(2,81) =8.27, p <.01 (see Appendix D far ANOVA Table). 
A Newman-Keuls test indicated that all comparisons within this main 
effect were significant, jg^.05. There was no significant effect 
of initial strategy, F(2,81) = 1.54, j>^>.10, and also no significant 
initial X final strategy interaction, F<1. These results indicate 
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Table 6 
Means and Standard Deviations of the 
Probability of Non-Dominant Responding as a Function of 
Initial and Final Strategy Conditions 
Initial Strategy 
DC 
DNC 
p 
.081 
( .195) 
.053 
( .142) 
.195 
( .245) 
F ina l S t ra tegy 
DC 
.205 
( .137) 
.343 
( .091) 
.279 
( .311) 
DNC 
.125 
( .135) 
.189 
(-153) 
.215 
( .238) 
*Standard deviations in Parentheses 
that both threat frequency and contingency are important deter-
minants of the Column player's probability of non-dominant respon-
ding during the final 75 trials of the game. This appears to be 
independent of the initial strategy conditions. 
Only two of the more sensitive stochastic measures could be 
examined: appeasement, p(C2/RlCl), and capitulation, p(C2/R2Cl). 
During the final 75 trials, the number of R1C2 outcomes did not 
exceed the criterion number (3 or more) for 42 out of a total of 
90 participants. Therefore, the generosity propensity, p(C2/RlC2), 
was not submitted to analysis. With respect to the doublecross 
propensity, p(Cl/R2C2), the number of R2C2 outcomes did not 
exceed the criterion number for 22 out of a total of 60 partici-
pants. Descriptive statistics for these two propensities as a 
function of initial and final strategy conditions are presented 
in Appendix E. 
The appeasement propensities during the final 75 trials are 
presented in Table 7 as a function of both initial and final stra-
tegy conditions. The propensities of the final DC and DNC strategy 
conditions are similar and both are higher than the propensities 
of the final P strategy conditions. These data were submitted to a 
3 X 3 analysis of variance (see Appendix F for ANOVA Table). This 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of final strategy con-
dition, _F(2,81) = 6.42, p_<.01. A Newman-Keuls test indicated that 
the DC and DNC strategy conditions differed significantly from the 
P strategy condition, p<.05, but not from each other. This findin 
suggests that during the final 75 trials, threat frequency alone 
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Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations* of the 
Appeasement Propensity, p(C2/RlCl), as a Function of 
Initial and Final Strategy Conditions 
Initial Strategy 
Condition 
P 
DC 
DNC 
Note. 2.2% of the appeas 
Final 
P 
.105 
(.240) 
.039 
(.089) 
.135 
(.168) 
ement data is 
Strategy 
DC 
.143 
(.117) 
.389 
(.315) 
.181 
(.162) 
estimated 
Condition 
DNC 
.155 
(.134) 
.316 
(.319) 
.194 
(.202) 
(2/90 observa-
tions). 
* Standard deviations in parentheses 
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is the prime determinant of this measure of the Column player's be-
haviour rather than threat contingency which exerted an effect 
during the initial 75 trials. There was no significant main effect 
of initial strategy condition, F(2,81) = 1.57, _p^ .10, and also no 
significant initial X final strategy interaction, F(4,81) = 2.06, 
P/.10. Therefore, participant's levels of appeasement during the 
final 75 trials appeared to be independent of the strategy condition 
experienced during the initial 75 trials. 
The capitulation data during the final 75 trials as a func-
tion of initial and final strategy conditions are presented in 
Figure 10. These data were submitted to a 3 X 2 analysis of var-
iance to determine delayed strategy effects (see Appendix G for 
ANOVA Table). The analysis revealed a significant main effect for 
initial strategy, F(2,54) = 4.29, p<.05, a significant main effect 
for final strategy, F(l,54) = 14.61, JJ^.OI, and a significant ini-
tial X final strategy interaction, F(2,54) = 5.36, p^.01. The 
interaction is displayed in Figure 10.' A test of simple main ef-
fects revealed a significant difference, _£<". 05, for the capitula-
tions propensity between the final DC and final DNC strategy condi-
tions when the initial strategy condition was P or DC, but not when 
the initial strategy condition was DNC, F<1. When the initial 
strategy condition was P or DC, the capitulation propensity was 
significantly higher in the final DC strategy condition. Therefore, 
there was an effect of threat contingency on the capitulation pro-
pensity when the initial 75 trials were either P or DC. The test 
5-
2-
0 
INITIAL X FINAL 
STRATEGY INTERACTION 
Rnal DC 
Final DNC 
DC 
INIT IAL STRATEGY 
DNC 
Figure 10. Initial X Final Strategy Interaction for the 
Capitulation Propensity, p(C2/R2C1) 
OO 
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of simple main effects also indicated that the level of capitulation 
in the final DC strategy condition varied significantly, p^.01, 
as a function of the initial strategy condition, while the level 
of capitulation in the final DNC strategy condition did not signi-
ficantly vary across initial strategy conditions, F<1. A Newman-
Keuls test indicated that the level of capitulation in the initial 
DC-final DC strategy condition (.527) was significantly higher, 
p^.05, than the capitulation levels of both the initial P-final 
DC (.262) and initial DNC-final DC (.201) strategy conditions which 
themselves did not differ significantly, p>.05. The lack of an 
effect of threat contingency when the initial strategy condition 
was DNC may be attributable to participants in the initial DNC -
final DC condition simply not detecting the change in contingency. 
Questionnaire Data 
A factor analysis of the 24-item postexperimental question-
naire was carried out in order to reduce these data to a set of 
underlying dimensions or factors. The factor scores were subjected 
to a 3 X 3 analysis of variance to determine whether differences in 
questionnaire responses were attributable to the particular strategy 
sequence experienced. 
Principal factoring with iterations generated seven factors 
from the 24 items. These factors were orthogonally rotated using 
a varimax solution (Nie et al. , 1975). The first three factors ac-
counted for 76.7% of the total variance (45.9%, 21.5% and 9.2% res-
pectively). Factor 4 ("Cleanliness") accounted for an additional 
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7.6% of the variance, but was not viewed as related to game-playing 
behaviour. Therefore, only the factor scores for the first three 
factors were submitted to an analysis of variance. Table 8 pre-
sents the items which had factor loadings greater than or equal to 
.50 on the three factors. 
Factor 1 was labelled "Evaluative" on the assumption that 
the items reflected the participant's impression of the other's 
general disposition as revealed during the course of the game. 
Items representing Factor 2 appear to be related to the participant's 
judgement of the other's game-playing style or ability and this fac-
tor was therefore labelled "style". Factor 3 ("Calmness") was so 
labelled because of the apparent nature of the two items "calm-
agitated" and "tense-relaxed". 
Factor 1, 2 and 3 scores were submitted to separate analyses 
of variance which indicated a significant final strategy main 
effect for Factor 3 scores only, F(2,81) = 3.35, p<.05 (see 
Appendix H for ANOVA Table). The mean Factor 3 scores for the final 
strategy main effect were 0.3495, -0.2200, and -0.1294 for the final 
P, DC and DNC strategy conditions respectively. A Newman-Keuls test 
revealed that opponents using a passive strategy during the last 75 
trials were perceived as being significantly more calm than oppon-
ents using either a DC or DNC strategy which themselves did not 
significantly differ, p>.05. With the exception of Factor 3, it 
appears that the Column player's perception of the opponent does 
not vary significantly as a function of the opponent's game-playing 
Table 8 
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Items Associated with Derived Factors 
Item Factor Loading 
Factor 1; Evaluative 
Warm-CoId 
Pleasant-Unpleasant 
Honest-Dishonest 
Untrustworthy-Trustworthy 
Good-Bad 
Nice-Awful 
Hostile-Friendly 
Peaceful-Ferocious 
Happy-Sad 
.51 
.69 
.71 
.64 
.72 
.78 
.83 
.50 
.58 
Factor 2: Style 
Intelligent-Unintelligent 
Weak-Strong 
Cowardly-Brave 
Active-Passive 
Competitive-Noncompetitive 
60 
53 
61 
84 
73 
Factor 3: Calmness 
Calm-Agitated 
Tense-Relaxed 
85 
62 
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behaviour in this experiment. 
Supplementary Analyses 
Three one-way analyses of variance for the final 75 trials 
of the game were performed on each of the following three depen-
dent measures across cells 1, 5 and 9 in which participants had 
experienced one of the P, DC or DNC strategies for the entire 150 
trial game: (a) the probability of non-dominant responding, 
(b) the appeasement propensity, and (c) the capitulation propen-
sity. Descriptive data for these supplementary analyses are pre-
sented in Table 9. All data were arcsin transformed prior to ana-
lyses. 
The analysis of the probability of non-dominant responding 
data revealed a significant effect of strategy condition, F(2,27) 
= 6.30, p<.01. A Newman-Keuls test indicated that the probability 
of non-dominant responding was significantly lower, j><.05, in 
the P strategy condition than in both the DC and DNC strategy con-
ditions which themselves did not differ significantly, j>>.05, 
suggesting that the frequency of threat is the prime determinant of 
final C2 responding over the final 75 trials of the game. 
A significant effect of strategy condition was also revealed 
on both the more sensitive appeasement and capitulation propensi-
ties, F(2,27) = 4.29, p<.05, and F(l,18) = 18.31, p<.01, respec-
tively. A Newman-Keuls test indicated that the appeasement propen-
site was significantly lower, j> <,. 05, in the P strategy condition 
than in the DC strategy condition but was not significantly lower 
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Table 9 
Means and Standard Deviations* of the Probability 
of Non-Dominant Responding, Appeasement and Capitulation 
Propensities Across the Final 75 Trials of Cells 1, 5, and 9 
Dependent Measure 
Probability of Non-
Dominant Responding 
Appeasement Propensity 
Capitulation Propensity** 
Strategy Condition 
p 
.081 
(.195) 
.105 
(.240) 
DC 
.343 
(.091) 
.389 
(.315) 
.527 
(.189) 
DNC 
.215 
(.238) 
.194 
(.202) 
.179 
(.179) 
* Standard deviations in parentheses 
**10% of the capitulation data is estimated (2/20 observations) 
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than in the DNC strategy condition, _p> .05. The DC and DNC strategy 
conditions were only marginally significantly different, p <". 10. 
The capitulation propensity was significantly higher in the DC 
strategy condition than in the DNC strategy condition. For the un-
changed strategy conditions, it appears that when two strategies 
differ with respect to both threat frequency and contingency, there 
is a significant difference in the Column player's propensity to 
appease. 
Discussion 
The primary purpose of this experiment was to separate the 
respective effects of threat frequency and threat contingency in 
a threat-vulnerable game. A second purpose was to examine the 
stability of these effects when strategies were altered in the final 
75 trials of the game. 
The essential features of any operational definition of 
threat include (a) the communication of an intention to do some-
thing detrimental to the interests of the other (Deutsch & Krauss, 
1962; Tedeschi, Bonoma, & Brown, 1971), and (b) the ability to carry 
out the threatened punishment contingent upon noncompliance by the 
other (Black & Higbee, 1973; Kelley, 1965; Tedeschi et al., 1971). 
In explicit threat situations, communication of such contingent 
threats is achieved by sending a message in the form of an if-then 
statement. Punishment is exacted by taking points from the other 
player's total. In tacit (structural) threat situations, communi-
cation of such threats is made via choice behaviour. 
In Game 21, the operational definition of threat (an R2 
choice) is consistent with the view held by game theorists that 
threat is a strategic move which is used by a player with the inten-
tion of influencing another player's behaviour (Schelling, 1960). 
The Row Player can induce the other player to shift to C2 if the 
other can be made to see that it is to his advantage to do so rather 
than to suffer the consequences of the Row player shifting. In-
ducement is the potential use of an R2 choice. If, after a number 
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of Cl responses by the Column player, the Row player uses threat, 
it can be said that the use of the R2 choice communicates a contin-
gency which may influence the behaviour of the threatened player. 
In the present study, a Row player who never used threat 
was said to be playing a passive strategy. The Row player was a 
passive player in the sense that he was continually and uncondi-
tionally cooperative He allowed the Column player to obtain his 
most preferred payoff indefinitely while he himself did not (a) at-
tempt to induce a shift, or (b) exact punishment for failure to 
shift, in order to obtain his own most preferred payoff. Such non-
use of the power to exert control over his own payoffs is identical 
to the behaviour of pure pacifists in other threat-vulnerable games 
(Gruder & Duslak, 1973; Guyer & Gordon, cited in Rapoport et al., 
197 6; Rapoport et al., 1971). 
A programmed strategy of 100% cooperative responding in a 
Prisoner's Dilemma game is also a passive strategy in that the uncon-
ditionally cooperative player allows the other to obtain his most 
preferred payoff on every trial. There is, however, no threat in 
a Prisoner's Dilemma game because the use of the individually rational 
choice (the payoff on any trial) does not serve to induce a shift 
on the part of the other player. This difference in structure bet-
ween the two games may account for the finding that, in the Prison-
er's Dilemma game, the passive 100% cooperative strategy evokes more 
cooperative responding on the part of participants than very low 
levels of programmed cooperation, whereas in Game 21, the passive 
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strategy evokes less "sharing" behaviour than the more demanding 
strategies. 
In both non-matrix gaming situations (e.g., Shure et al., 
1965; Vincent & Tindell, 1969), and in threat-vulnerable game stu-
dies (Gruder & Duslak, 1973; Guyer & Gordon, cited in Rapoport et 
al., 1976), the pacifist strategy has not been successful in 
inducing cooperation. In threat-vulnerable games, when the passive 
noncontingent strategy was compared to the more demanding and 
contingent strategies, the passive strategy evoked both a lower 
probability of non-dominant responding by the Column player and a 
lower probability of appeasement. 
The inclusion of the demanding but noncontingent (DNC) 
strategy in the present study, was meant to provide a method for 
determining whether threat frequency or threat contingency is the 
prime determinant of the Column player's behaviour. By extension, 
the use of the DNC strategy also permits the examination of the 
stability of these effects under three conditions (prior exposure 
to the three initial strategies). 
Overall Results 
In general, Column players in the present study were not 
predisposed to deviate frequently from the rational choice on any 
single trial of the game. The overall level of the probability of 
non-dominant responding was .189 across all conditions. That Cl is 
the preferred choice of the Column players is further supported 
by the doublecross propensity, p(Cl/R2C2), which was higher than all 
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other propensities where such comparisons are possible in the pre-
sent study. Previous studies using threat-vulnerable games in 
either real play or simulated opponent situations have found simi-
lar results (Gruder & Duslak, 1973; Guyer & Gordon, cited in Rapo-
port et al., 1976; Guyer and Rapoport, 1970; Rapoport et al., 1971; 
Santi & Wells, 1975). However, both the probability of non-dominant 
msponding and the more sensitive stochastic measures were affected 
by the frequency and the contingency of threat. 
The present data indicated that both threat frequency and 
threat contingency had significant effects on various aspects of the 
Column player's behaviour. Threat frequency was a determinant of 
both the Column player's probability of non-dominant responding as 
well as the propensity to appease during the final 75 trials of the 
game. Threat contingency affected both the levels of appeasement 
and capitulation during the initial 75 trials, as well as the pro-
bability of non-dominant responding during the final 75 trials. In 
addition, an effect of threat contingency on the capitulation measure 
during the final 75 trials was found which was dependent upon the 
strategy condition experienced during the initial 75 trials. Over-
all, the pattern of results suggests that the effects of threat con-
tingency can be observed at earlier points in the interaction sequence 
than the effects of threat frequency. 
Delayed Strategy Effects 
Only one significant delayed strategy effect was found in the 
present study. The interaction of initial and final strategies for 
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the capitulation propensity resulted from a significant delayed 
strategy effect for the final DC strategy condition. Specifically, 
the capitulation propensity for the final DC strategy condition was 
not significantly different for the initial P - final DC and the ini-
tial DNC - final DC conditions but both of these differed signifi-
cantly from the initial DC - final DC strategy condition. This 
finding is consistent with previous research using the Prisoner's 
Dilemma game (Oskamp, 1970; Sermat, 1967), where it was found that 
the current contingent nature of tit-for-tat strategy overrides the 
effects of prior exposure to both the noncontingent 0% and 100% 
cooperative strategies. 
This interaction indicated that there was an effect of threat 
contingency (in terms of the final DNC vs. the final DC strategy 
comparison) on the capitulation propensity when the initial strategy 
had been P or DC but not when the initial strategy condition had 
been DNC. Two explanations for the lack of an effect of threat con-
tingency when the initial strategy condition had been DNC are pos-
sible: (a) The addition of threat contingency in the shift from 
the initial DNC to the final DC strategy was not discernible; or 
(b) Although the Column player may have been sensitive to the shift, 
psychological factors such as "getting back" at the previously in-
consistent opponent by responding dominantly, regardless of the con-
tingencies of the current DC strategy, were coming into play. In 
future research, the former interpretation might be verified if, 
at the point of the shift, a few trials of sequential Rl responding 
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or an explicit communication concerning a change in strategy were 
delivered such that the Column player may be sensitized to the shift. 
If the discernibility of the shift had been enhanced, perhaps an 
effect of threat contingency might have been found when the initial 
strategy condition had been DNC as well. 
The interaction also indicated that the Column player's be-
haviour during the final DNC strategy condition was independent of 
the initial strategy condition. The explanation for such an outcome 
may lie in the programme's rules for feedback. In all DC strategy 
conditions, once an R2Cl outcome had occurred, the only way to re-
establish the RlCl outcome was to shift to C2 (i.e., capitulate). 
If the participant repeated the Cl response, R2 responses continued. 
In all DNC strategy conditions, to shift to C2 after the R2C1 out-
come would not necessarily guarantee the re-establishment of the RlCl 
outcome. In fact, for these participants, deviation from the Cl 
response could result unpredictably in the R2C2 outcome, giving 
the player his least preferred payoff. Given the undesirable conse-
quences of deviations from Cl in all DNC strategy conditions, the 
finding that the capitulation propensities for the final DNC stra-
tegy condition were determined by the current noncontingent nature 
of the DNC strategy independent of initial strategy conditions appears 
reasonable. 
The effects of threat contingency and threat frequency are 
difficult to separate for the capitulation measure because this 
measure is not defined for the passive strategy. However, data pre-
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sented above suggest that the contingency rather than the fre-
quency of threat during the initial 75 trials affected the level 
of capitulation for the final DC strategy condition. Therefore, 
stating that the capitulation measure is sensitive to the contingency 
of threat does not mean that threat frequency has no role whatsoever 
in determining the propensity to capitulate. However, the present 
data failed to show any delayed effect of threat frequency on capi-
tulation, while at the same time showing a strong delayed effect of 
threat contingency. 
Previous research using Game 19 (Guyer 6c Gordon, cited in 
Rapoport et al., 1976) has shown that two contingent strategies, 
differing only in the frequency of R2, will produce very similar 
levels of capitulation indicating again that threat frequency may 
not be an important determinant of the Column player's propensity to 
capitulate. On this basis, it might be suggested that the lower 
propensity to capitulate found in real play situations versus simu-
lated opponent situations may be attributable to the lack of consis-
tent contingent use of R2 by the bona fide Row players rather than 
the concomitant lower frequency of R2 in real play situations (Guyer 
and Gordon, cited in Rapoport et al., 1976; Guyer and Rapoport, 1970; 
Rapoport et al., 1971; Santi and Wells, 1975, Variant 2). 
The effects of threat frequency and threat contingency can be 
separated with respect to the appeasement and the probability of non-
dominant responding measures as well. Previous research which com-
pared two contingent and demanding strategies to the P strategy 
96 
(Gruder and Duslak, 1973; Guyer and Gordon, cited in Rapoport et al. , 
1976) found that the P strategy evoked both a lower propensity of 
appeasement and a lower probability of non-dominant responding. The 
findings of the present study were consistent with this research in 
that both during the initial and final 75 trials, the P strategy 
evoked a significantly lower propensity to appease than the DC stra-
tegy. Although threat contingency was the prime determinant of 
the Column player's propensity to appease across the initial stra-
tegy conditions, threat frequency was the prime determinant 
behaviour across the final strategy conditions and this was indepen-
dent of the strategy condition experienced during the initial 75 
trials. Thus, the results for the appeasement propensity were con-
sistent with the suggestion that appeasement is sensitive to differ-
ences in the Row player's behaviour (Guyer and Rapoport, 1970; Santi 
and Wells, 1975) but the results further revealed that this measure 
of the Column player's behaviour was affected by both the frequency 
and contingency of threat, albeit at different points in the inter-
action. 
While both threat frequency and threat contingency affected 
the probability of non-dominant responding during the final 75 
trials of the game, independent of the initial strategy condition, 
this measure was not as sensitive as the stochastic measures. Given 
that participants in the DC strategy conditions tended to both ap-
pease and capitulate more frequently than in oilier ;; I r ;i («'KV <<>nclll IOIIM. 
the significant difference in the proUibi I i t y ok non-dominant lespoti-
xng between the final DC and final DNC strategy conditions could be 
expected. That the final P and final DNC conditions differed sig-
nificantly as well can only be attributed to the current differences 
in the frequency of threat. Thus, both threat contingency and 
threat frequency were important determinants of overall C2 respond-
ing. 
In summary, on those measures for which the effects of threat 
frequency and threat contingency could be separated, it was found 
that both variables were important determinants of the Column player' 
behaviour. That response contingency is an important determinant of 
behaviour in Prisoner's Dilemma games has been noted by previous 
researchers (Crumbaugh 6e Evans, 1967; Downing et al., 1975; Downing 
6c Ritter, Note 3; Kahn et al., 1971; McNeel, 1973). The effects of 
threat contingency were pronounced for the capitulation measure, 
were sequence dependent, but did not definitely rule out the possi-
bility that threat frequency may also play a role in determining the 
levels of capitulation for Column players. 
Postexperimental Questionnaire 
As noted above, the present findings verified the results of 
previous studies in that the passive strategy in threat-vulnerable 
games was not successful for inducing cooperation. 
The explanation for such findings usually focuses on the 
attributions an exploiter might make about his victim (Gruder and 
Duslak, 1973; Swingle, 1974). Participants' behaviour in games has 
been shown to be affected by the personality dispositions which are 
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attributed to the opponent (Marlowe, Gergen, and Doob, 1966) and by 
their perception of the opponent's intentions (e.g., to be fair or 
exploitative, etc.) at the onset of the game (Gruder, 1971; 
Murdoch, 1967). A passive opponent who leaves himself open to con-
tinued exploitation may be perceived as foolish or incompetent in 
comparison to an opponent who responds by removing himself from the 
vulnerable position. An undonditionally cooperative opponent is 
perceived in a very similar light (Swingle, 1974). 
No support was found in the present study for such an 
explanation of the differences in behaviour between the DC and P 
strategy conditions. Only Factor 3 ("Calmness") was found to diff-
erentiate the demanding strategies from the passive strategy. This 
finding appears quite reasonable given that "Calmness" would seem to 
be most easily inferred from the frequency with which an opponent 
uses the R2 choice. Hence, although the participant's behaviour 
differed as a function of the simulated opponent's behaviour, his 
perception of the other was relatively quite stable. Evidently, an 
exploiter can continue to take advantage of a "victim" without nec-
essarily attributing to that individual any greater or lesser degree 
of intelligence, honesty, trustworthiness, et cetera. Hence, con-
trary to previous reports it appears that attribution of incompetence 
and foolishness are not necessary conditions for an exploiter to con-
tinue taking advantage of a passive opponent (Gruder 6e Duslak, 1973; 
Gruder, 1971; Marlowe et al., 1966). 
Conclusions 
The following are the major contributions which this 
research has made to the experimental literature on threat-vulnerable 
games. 
1. The present study replicates previous findings that a demanding 
contingent strategy is more effective than a passive strategy 
in gaining concessions from the Column player. 
2. The present study goes beyond previous work in demonstrating 
that two separable aspects of the demanding contingent strategy, 
namely the patterning of threat and the frequency of threat, 
both make independent contributions to the gaining of concessions 
from the Column player. However, a simple statement of the 
relative importance of these two aspects is difficult to make 
because their relative effectiveness depends both on the 
specific dependent variable and the point in the interaction 
sequence which is examined. 
3. The effects of strategy shifts were also complicated by the 
nature of the dependent variable considered. For the capitu-
lation propensity, the effects observed during the last 75 
trials depended upon the strategy experienced during the first 
75 trials. However, for both the probability of non-dominant 
responding and the appeasement propensity, the effects observed 
during the last 75 trials were a function of the strategy 
conditions in effect at that time and did not depend upon the 
type of strategy experienced during the first 75 trials. These 
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differential strategy shift effects for the appeasement 
and capitulation measures are consistent with previous research 
which indicated that appeasement may be more responsive to shifts 
in strategy on the part of the Row player than capitulation. 
4. The high level of "exploitation" noted in the passive strategy 
condition is entirely consistent with previous reports in the 
literature. Gruder and Duslak (1973) suggested that the 
failure to respond to exploitation results in the exploiter 
attributing foolishness or incompetence to the passive 
opponent and that these attributions lead the exploiter to 
continue to take advantage of the passive "victim." Data 
obtained from the postexperimental questionnaire lend no 
support to this hypothesis. In fact, they indicate that 
the attribution of negative traits is not a necessary con-
dition for an exploiter to continue taking advantage of a 
passive opponent. 
5. Future research might best be directed toward the examination 
of the respective effects of threat frequency and threat 
contingency when different shifts in strategy conditions 
are undertaken. Researchers interested in such shifts might 
be advised to (a) ensure that a shift from a noncontingent 
yoked control strategy to a contingent strategy is preceded 
by a number of predetermined responses or an explicit communi-
cation which would ensure that such a shift is perceived by 
participants, and (b) include stochastic measures in any 
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study because of their evident sensitivity to the behaviour of 
the other player. Under these experimental conditions it 
would be possible to parse out the separate effects of threat 
frequency and contingency when shifts in strategy are pronounced. 
Reference Notes 
1. Rapoport, A. Games as tools of psychological research. Mental 
Health Research Institute Preprint, University of Michigan, 1966. 
2. Flint, R.A., Harris, R.J., 6c Rector, L. A failure of communica-
tion. Paper presented at the meeting of the Rocky Mountain 
Psychological Association, Salt Lake City, 1970. 
3. Downing, L. L. , 6c Ritter, E. H. Effects of contingencies on 
cooperative responding in a Prisoner's Dilemma game with antici-
pated shock outcomes. Unpublished manuscript, University of 
Georgia, 1975. 
102 
References 
Bedell, J., &. Sistrunk, F. Power, opportunity costs, and sex in 
a mixed-motive game. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1973, 25, 219-226. 
Bennett, R.P., 6c Carbonari, J.B. Personality patterns related to 
own, joint, and relative gain maximization behaviors. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1976, 34, 
1127-1134. 
Benton, A. A. Reactions to various patterns of deceit in a mixed-
motive game. Psychonomic Science, 1972, _29, 333-336. 
Berkowitz, N.H., Hylander, L. , 6c Bakaitis, R. Defense, vulnerability 
and cooperation. Journal of Personality and Social Psycho-
logy, 1973, 25, 401-407. 
Bixenstine, V. E. , Chambers, N. , 6e Wilson, D. V. Effect of asymmetry 
in payoff on behavior in a two-person, non-zero-sum game. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1964, 8, 151-159. 
Bixenstine, V. E. , Potash, H.M. , 6c Wilson, K. V. Effects of level of 
cooperative choice by the other player on choices in a Pri-
soner's Dilemma game: Part I. Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, 1963, j>6, 308-313. 
Bixenstine, V. E. , 6e Wilson, K.V. Effect of level of cooperative 
choice by the other player on choices in a Prisoner's Dilemma 
game: Part II. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 
1963, 67, 139-147. 
103 
104 
Black, T. E. , 6e Higbee, K. L. Effect of power, threat, and sex on 
exploitation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
1973, J27, 382-388. 
Bonoma, T.V. , 6e Tedeschi, J. T. Some effects of source behaviour on 
target's compliance to threats. Behavioral Science, 1973, 
JL8, 34-41. 
Borah, L. A. The effects of threat in bargaining: Critical and 
experimental analysis. Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 1963, j>6, 37-44. 
Braver, S.L. , 6e Barnett, B. Effects of modeling on cooperation in 
a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1976, 33, 161-169. 
Braver, S.L. , 6c Rohrer, V. When martyrdom pays: The effects of 
information concerning the opponent's past game behavior. 
journal of Conflict Resolution, 1975, 19, 652-662. 
Caldwell, M.D. Communication and sex effects in a five-person 
Prisoner's Dilemma game. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1976, 33, 273-280. 
Carment, D.W. Effects of sex role in a maximizing difference game: 
A replication in Canada. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
1974, _18, 461-472. 
Chapanis, A. Prelude to 2001: Explorations in human communication. 
American Psychologist, 1971, _26, 949-961. 
Cheney, J., Harford, T., 6e Solomon, L. The effects of communicating 
threats and promises upon the bargaining process. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 1972, _16, 99-107. 
Crowne, D.P. Family orientation, level of aspirations and inter-
personal bargaining. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1966, 3, 641-645. 
Crumbaugh, CM., 6= Evans, G.W. Presentation format, other-person 
strategies, and cooperative behavior in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma. Psychological Reports, 1967, _20, 895-902. 
Dawes, R.M., McTavish, J., 6c Shaklee, H. Behavior, communication, 
and assumptions about other people's behavior in a commons 
dilemma situation. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1977, 35, 1-11. 
Deutsch, M. Trust, trustworthiness, and the F-Scale. Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, _6jL, 138-140. 
Deutsch, M., 6c Krauss, R.M. The effect of threat upon interpersonal 
bargaining. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 
_61, 181-189. 
Deutsch, M., 6e Krauss, R.M. Studies in interpersonal bargaining. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1962, 6, 52-76. 
Dorris, J.W. Reactions to unconditional cooperation; A field study 
emphasizing variables neglected in laboratory research. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972, _22, 387-
397. 
Downing, L.L. The Prisoner's Dilemma game as a problem-solving 
phenomenon: An outcome maximization interpretation. Simula-
tion and Games, 1975, 6, 366-391. 
106 
Downing, L. L., Rywick, T., Hasting, W., 6c Kahn, A. Competitive 
behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: Social motives 
versus individual outcome maximization. JSAS Catalog of 
Selected Documents in Psychology, 1975, 5 (Ms. No. 234) 
Enzle, M. E. , Hansen, R. D. , 6c Lowe, C. L. Humanizing the mixed-
motive paradigm; Methodological innovations from attribution 
theory. Simulations and Games, 1975, J>, 151-165. 
Faley, T. , 6c Tedeschi, J.T. Status and reactions to threats. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, _17, 192-
199. 
Friedland, N., Arnold. S., 6e Thibault, J. Motivational bases in 
moxed-motive interactions: The effects of comparison levels. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1974, J^, 188-199. 
Gahagan, J.P., 6c Tedeschi, J.T. Strategy and the credibility of 
promises in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 1968, YL, 224-234. 
Gallo, P. S., Funk, S.G. , 6e Levine, J.R. Reward size, eethod of pre-
sentation and number of alternatives in a Prisoner's Dilemma 
game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 13, 
239-244. 
Gallo, P. S., 6c McClintock, C. G. Cooperative and competitive beha-
vior in mixed-motive games. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
1965, 9, 68-78. 
Gallo, P.S., 6c Sheposh, J. Effects of incentive magnitude on coopera-
tion in a Prisoner's Dilemma game: A reply to Gumpert and 
107 
Epstein. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, 
^9, 42-46. 
Gardin, H., Kaplan, K. J., Firestone, I.J., 6c Cowan, G. Proxemic 
effects on cooperation, attitudes and approach-avoidance in 
a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1973, J27, 3-18. 
Gillis, J.S., 6c Woods, G.T. The 16PF as an indicator of performance 
in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
1971, JJ>, 393-401. 
Grandberg, D., Stevens, J.C., 6c Katz, S. Effects of communication 
on cooperation in expanded Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken 
games. Simulation and Games, 1975, 6, 166-187. 
Gruder, C.L. Relationships with opponent and partner in mixed-motive 
bargaining. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1971, _15, 403-
416. 
Gruder, C. L. , 6c Duslak, R. J. Elicitation of cooperation by retalia-
tory and nonretaliatory strategies in a mixed-motive game. 
Journal c-f Conflict Resolution, 1973, J7, 162-174. 
Guyer, M., Hamberger, H., 6c Fox, J. Format effects in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma game. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1973, _17, 719-
744. 
Guyer, M., 6e Rapoport, A. Threat in a two-person game. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 1970, 6, 11-25. 
Guyer, M., 6c Rapoport, A. 2 X 2 games played once. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 1972, 16, 409-431. 
108 
Hamberger, H. Take some - A format and family of games. Behavioral 
Science, 1974, JL9, 28-34. 
Harford, T.C., Jr., & Hill, M. Variations in behavioral strategies 
and interpersonal trust in a two-person game with male alcho-
holics. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 1967, _23, 33-35. 
Harford, T. C, Jr., 6e Solomon, L. "Reformed sinner" and "lapsed 
saint" strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 1967, JUL, 104-109. 
Heller, J.R. The effects of racial prejudice, feedback strategy, 
and race on cooperative-competitive behavior. Dissertation 
Abstracts International, 1967, Z7, 2507-08B. 
Horai, J., 6c Tedeschi, J.T. The effects of capability and magnitude 
of punishment upon compliance. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 1969, VL, 164-169. 
Horai, J., 6e Tedeschi, J.T. Compliance and the use of threats and 
promises after a power reversal. Behavioral Science, 1975, 
20, 117-124. 
Homstein, H. A. The effects of different magnitudes of threat upon 
interpresonal bargaining. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 1965, 1, 282-293. 
Ingram, B.L., 6e Berger, S. E. Sex-role orientation, defensiveness, 
and competitiveness in women. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
1977, _21, 501-518. 
Jones, B., Steele, M., Gahagan, J., 6e Tedeschi, J. Matrix values 
and cooperative behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. 
109 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 8, 148-
153. 
Kahn, A. Hottes, L., 6c Davis, W. L. Cooperation and optimal res-
ponding in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: The effects of sex 
and physical attractiveness. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 1971, J7, 267-279. 
Kelley, H.H. Experimental studies of threats in interpersonal ne-
gotiations. Journal of Conflict Resolution,.1965, 9, 79-
105. 
Kirk, R.E. Experimental Design: Procedures for the Behavioral 
Sciences. Belmont: Brooks/Cole, 1968. 
Knapp, W.M., 6c Podell, J.E. Mental patients, prisoners and students 
with simulated partners in a mixed-motive game. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 1968, JL2, 235-241. 
Knight, G.P., 6c Mack, D. Race and behavior in a Prisoner's Dilemma 
game. Psychological Record, 1973, J3, 61-64. 
Knox, R.E. , 6e Douglas, R.L. Trivial incentives, marginal compre-
hension, and dubious generalizations from the Prisoner's 
Dilemma studies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
1971, _20, 160-165. 
Komorita, S. S. Cooperative choice in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, _2, 741-
745. 
Krauss, R.M. Structural and attitudinal factors in interpersonal 
bargaining. Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology, 
110 
1966, 2, 42-55. 
Krauss, R.M., & Deutsch, M. Communication in interpersonal bargain-
ing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 
4, 572-577. 
Kuhlman, D.M., & Marshello, A. Individual-differences in game 
motives of own, relative, and joint gain. Journal of Research 
in Personality, 1975, % 240-251. (a) 
Kuhlman, D.M., & Marshello, A. Individual differences in game moti-
vation as moderators of preprogrammed strategy effects in 
Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psycho-
logy, 1975, 32, 922-931. (b) 
Lave, L.B. Factors affecting cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. 
Behavioral Science, 1965, 10, 26-38. 
Lieberman, B. Human behavior in a strictly determined 3 X 3 matrix 
game. Behavioral Science, 1960, ^ , 317-322. 
Lindskold, S., Bennet, R., & Wayner, M. Retaliation level as a 
foundation for subsequent conciliation. Behavioral Science, 
1976, _21, 13-18. 
Lindskold, S., McElwain, D.C., & Wayner, M. Cooperation and the 
use of coercion by groups and individuals. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 1977, _21, 531-550. 
Lynch, G.W. Defense preference and cooperation and competition in 
a game. Dissertation Abstracts International, 1968, 29, 
1174B. 
Mack, D, Status and behavior in the reiterated Prisoner's Dilemma 
game. Psychological Record. 1976, 26, 529-532. 
Ill 
Mack, D. , Auburn, P. N. , 6e Knight, G. P. Sex-role identification and 
behavior in a reiterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Psychono-
mic Science, 1971, 24, 280-282. 
Marin, G. Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma and personality 
correlates: A non-existent relationship. Peace Research, 
1973, 5, 29-32. 
Marlowe, D., Gergen, K. J., 6c Doob, A.N. Opponent's personality, 
expectation of social interaction, and interpersonal bar-
gaining. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 
3, 206-213. 
Marwell, G., Schmitt, D. R. , & Boyesen, B. Pacifist strategy and 
cooperation under interpersonal risk. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 1973, 25, 12-20. 
Marwell, G., Schmitt, D.R., 6c Shotola, R. Cooperation and interpersonal 
risk. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, 18, 
9-32. 
McClintock, C. G., Harrison, A., Strand, S. , 6c Gallo, P. Interna-
tionalism-isolationism, strategy of the other player, and 
two-person game behavior. Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 1963, _67, 631-635. 
McClintock, C.G., Nuttin, J.M., Jr., McNeel, S.P. Sociometric choice, 
visual presence, and game playing behavior. Behavioral Science, 
1970, 15, 124-131. 
McNeel, S.P. Training cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1973, _9, 335-348. 
McNeel, S.P. , McClintock, C.G. , 6c Nut tin, J.M. Effects of sex-role 
in a two-person mixed-motive game. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 1972, _24, 372-380. 
Meeker, R. J. , 6c Shure, G. H. Pacifist bargaining tactics; Some 
"outsider" influences. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
1969, JL5, 261-269. 
Meeker, R. J., Shure, G.H., 6e Moore, W.H., Jr. Real-time computer 
studies of bargaining behavior: The effects of threat upon 
bargaining. Proceedings of the American Information Society 
Conference, 1964, 25, 115-123. 
Michelini, R.L. Compliance to threat as a function of knowledge 
of the sources' prior losses. Bulletin of the Psychonomic 
Society, 1975, 5, 223-225. 
Michener, H. A. , 6c Cohen, E. D. Effects of punishment magnitude in 
the bilateral threat situation: Evidence for the deterrence 
hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
1973, 25, 427-438. 
Miller, D. T. , 6c Holmes, J. F. The role of situational restrictive-
ness on self-fulfilling prophecies: A theoretical and empiri-
cal extension of Kelly and Stahelski's triangle hypothesis. 
Journal of Personality, 1975, 31> 661-673. 
Miller, R. R. No play: A means of conflict resolution. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 6, 150-156. 
Mogy, R.B., & Pruitt, J. Effect of threateners enforcement costs 
on threat credibility and compliance. Journal of Personality 
113 
and Social Psychology, 1974, _29, 173-180. 
Monteverde, F., Paschke, R., 6c Tedeschi, J.T. The effectiveness 
of honesty and deceit as influence factors. Sociometry, 
1974, 37, 583-591. 
Murdoch, P. The development of contractual norms in a dyad. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 6, 
206-211. 
Nacci, P., 6c Tedeschi, J.T. Trust and reactions to threat. 
Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 1973, _1, 421-422. 
Nardin, T. Communication and the effects of threat in strategic 
interaction. Peace Research Society: Papers, IX, Cambridge 
Conference, 1968. 
Nemeth, C. A critical analysis of research utilizing the Prisoner's 
Dilemma paradigm for the study of bargaining. Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology, 1972, 6, 203-234. 
Nie, N.H. , Hull, C.H. , Jenkins, J. G. , Steinbrenner, K. , 6e Bent, D.H. , 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1975. 
Ofshe, R. The effectiveness of pacifist strategies: A theoretical 
approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1971, L5, 261-
269. 
Orcutt, J., 6c Anderson, R. Social interaction, dehumanization and 
the "computerized other". Sociology and Social Research, 1977, 
61, 380-397. 
Oskamp, S. Effects of programmed initial strategies in a Prisoner's 
Dilemma game. Psychonomic Science, 1970, 19, 195-196. 
Oskamp, S. Effects of programmed strategies on cooperation in the 
Prisoner's Dilemma and other mixed-motive games. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 1971, L5, 225-259. 
Oskamp, S. Comparison of sequential and simultaneous responding, 
matrix, and strategy variables in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1974, Jj5, 107-116. 
Oskamp, S. , 6c Kleinke, C. Amount of reward as a variable in the 
Prisoner's Dilemma game. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1970, 16, 133-140. 
Oskamp, S. , 6c Perlman, D. Factors affecting cooperation in a 
Prisoner's Dilemma game. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
1965, 9, 359-374. 
Payne, W. Acquisition of strategies in gaming situations. Percep-
tual and Motor Skills, 1965, 20, 473-479. 
Pruitt, D. G , 6c Kimmel, M.J. Twenty years of experimental gaming: 
Critique, synthesis, and suggestions for the future. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 1977, _28, 363-392. 
Rapoport, A. Prospects for experimental games. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 1968, _12, 461-470. 
Rapoport, A., 6c Chammah, A.M. Prisoner's Dilemma: A study in 
Conflict and Cooperation. Ann Arbor; University of Michigan 
Press, 1965. 
Rapoport, A. , & Chammah, A.M. The game of Chicken. American Beha-
vioral Scientist, 1966, 10, 10-28. 
Rapoport, A., Guyer, M. A. A taxonomy of 2 X 2 games. General 
Systems, 1966, U , 203-214. 
Rapoport, A., Guyer, M. , 6c Gordon, D. A. A comparison of perform-
ances of Danish and American students in a threat game. 
Behavioral Science, 1971, JL6, 456-466. 
Rapoport, A. , Guyer, M. , 6e Gordon, D. The 2 X 2 Game. Ann Arbor; 
University of Michigan Press, 1976. 
Rapoport, A. , 6c Mowshowitz. , A. Experimental studies of stochastic 
models for the Prisoner's Dilemma. Behavioral Science, 
1966, Yl, 444-458. 
Rapoport, A., 6c Orwant, C. Experimental games: A review. Beha-
vioral Science, 1962, 1_, 1-37. 
Santi, A. , 6c Wells, R. Strategy choices in three variants of a 
threat-vulnerable game. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1975, _3J., 776-786. 
Schelling, T.C. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1960. 
Schlenker, B.R. , 6e Bonoma, T. V. Fun and games: The validity of 
games for the study of conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolu-
tion, 1978, 22, 7-39. 
Schlenker, B. R. , Bonoma, T. V. , Tedeschi, J.T. , 6e Pivnick, W. P. 
Compliance to threats as a function of the wording of the 
threat and the exploitiveness of the threatener. Sociometry, 
1970, 33, 394-408. 
116 
Scodel, A. Induced collaboration in some non-zero-sum games. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1962, 6, 143-148. 
Scodel, A., Minas, J. S. , Ratoosh, P., 6c Lipetz, M. Some descriptive 
aspects of two-person non-zero-sum games. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 1959, 3, 114-119. 
Sermat, V. The effect of an initial cooperative or competitive 
treatment upon a subject's response to conditional coopera-
tion. Behavioral Science, 1967, _12, 301-313. 
Shaw, J.I. Reward size and game playing behavior. Scandinavian 
Journal of Psychology, 1972, JL3, 121-132. 
Shaw, J.I., 6c Thorslund, C. Varying patterns of reward cooperation: 
The effects .in a Prisoner* s Dilemma game. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 1975, JL9, 108-122. 
Shomer, R.W., Davis, A.N., 6c Kelley, H.H. Threats and the develop-
ment of coordination: Further studies of the Deutsch and 
Krauss trucking game. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1966, 4, 119-126. 
Shure, G. H. , 6c Meeker, R.J. Empirical demonstration of normative 
behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Proceedings of the 76th 
Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, 
1968, 3, 61-62. 
Shure, G.H. , Meeker, R. J. , 6c Hansford, E.H. The effectiveness of 
pacifist strategies in bargaining games. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 1965, 9, 106-117. 
Skotko, V., Langmeyer, D., 6c Lundgren, D.C. Sex differences as 
117 
artifact in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 1974, 18, 707-713. 
Slusher, E. A. , Roering, K. J., 6e Rose, G. L. The effects of commit-
ment to future interaction in single plays of three games. 
Behavioral Science, 1974, Jj), 119-132. 
Smith, W.P., 6c Anderson, A.J. Threats, communication, and bargain-
ing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 
76-82. 
Smith, N. S. , Vernon, C. R. , 6e Tarte, R. D. Random strategies and 
sex differences in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 1975, _19, 643-650. 
Solomon, L. The influence of some types of power relationships 
and game strategies upon the development of interpersonal 
trust. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 
223-230. 
Steele, M.W., 6= Tedeschi, J. Matrix indices and strategy choices in 
mixed-motive games. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1967, 
11, 198-205. 
Swensson, T.G. Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: I. The 
effects of asymmetric payoff information and explicit communi-
cation. Behavioral Science, 1967, _12, 314-322. 
Swingle, P.G. Effects of prior exposure to cooperative or competi-
tive treatment upon subject's responding in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1968, 10, 44-52. 
118 
Swingle, P.G. Exploitative behavior in non-zero-sum games. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 16, 
121-132. 
Swingle, P.G. The effects of game structure and subject's beha-
vior on attitudes toward cooperative opponents. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 1974, JL8, 714-726. 
Swingle, P.G., 6e Coady, H. Effects of partner's abrupt strategy 
change upon the subject's responding in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
1967, 5, 357-363. 
Swingle, P.G., 6c Gillis, J.S. Effects of emotional relationships 
between protagonists in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, _23, 160-165. 
Swingle, P.G., 6c MacLean, B. The effects of illusory power in non-
zero-sum games. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1971, 15, 
513-522. 
Swingle, P. G. , 6e Santi, A. Communication in non-zero-sum games. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972, 22, 54-
63. 
Tedeschi, J.T. Threats and promises. In P. Swingle (Ed.), The 
Structure of Conflict. New York: Academic Press, 1970, 155-
191. 
Tedeschi, J. T. , Bonoma, T. V. , 6c Brown, R. C. A paradigm for the 
study of coercive power. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
1971, 15, 197-223. 
Tedeschi, J. T., Bonoma, T. V. , 6c Lindskold, S. Threatener's reac-
tions to prior announcement of behavioral compliance or 
defiance. Behavioral Science, 1970, _15, 171-179. 
Tedeschi, J.T., Bonoma, T. V., 6c Novinson, N. Behavior of a threa-
tener; Retaliation versus fixed opportunity costs. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1970, V+, 69-76. 
Tedeschi, J. T., Horai, J., Lindskold, S., 6c Faley, T. The effects 
of opportunity costs and target compliance on the behavior 
of a threatening source. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 1970, 6, 205-209. 
Terhune, K.W. Motives, situation, and interpersonal conflict within 
the Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology Monograph, 1968, 3 (Pt.2). 
Terhune, K.W. The effects of personality in cooperation and con-
flict. In P. Swingle (Ed.), The Structure of Conflict. 
New York; Academic Press, 1970. 
Terhune, K.W. "Wash-in", "Wash-out", and systemic effects in ex-
tended Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
1974, JL8, 656-687. 
Tindell, J.O., 6c Vincent, J.E. The effects of different ratios of 
force and aggression: An experiment in simulation. 
Quarterly Journal of the Florida Academy of Sciences, 1970, 
33, 294-320. 
Tyszka, T., 6c Grzelak, J. Criteria of choice in non-constant-sum 
games. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1976, 20, 357-376. 
Vincent, J.E. , 6c Schwerin, E.W. Ratxos of force and escalation 
in a game situation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
1971, 15, 490-511. 
Vincent, J.E., 6c Tindell, J.O. Alternative cooperative strategies 
in a bargaining game. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1969, 
^3, 494-510. 
Vitz, P. C , 6c Kite, W. R. Factors affecting conflict and negotia-
tion within an alliance. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 1970, 6, 233-247. 
Voissem, N.H., & Sistrunk, F. Communication schedule and coopera-
tive game behavior. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1971, 19, 160-167. 
Von Neuman, J., 6e Morgenstern, 0. Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior. New York; John Wiley and Sons, 1944. 
Wallace, D.G., 6c Rothaus, P. Communication, group loyalty, and 
trust in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 1969, JL3, 370-380. 
Whitworth, R. H., 6c Lucker, W. Effects of strategy on cooperative 
behavior in culturally disadvantaged and college populations. 
Proceedings of the 77th Annual Convention of the American 
Psychological Association, 1969, 4, 305-306. 
Wichman, H. Effects of isolation and communication on cooperation 
in a two-person game. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1970, _16, 114-120. 
121 
Wilson, W. Cooperation and the cooperativeness of the other player. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1969, _13, 110-117. 
Wilson, W. Reciprocation and other techniques for inducing coopera-
tion in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 1971, ^ 5, 167-196. 
Winer, B. Statistical Principles in Experimental Design. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1962. 
Wyer, R.S. Prediction of behavior in two-person games. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, U , 222-238. 
Wyer, R. S. , 6c Polen, S.J. Some effects of fate control upon the 
tendency to benefit an exploitative other. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, _20, 44-54. 
Young, J.W. Behavioral and perceptual differences between struc-
turally equivalent two person games: A rich versus a poor 
context comparison. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1977, 
21, 299-322. 
APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTIONS 
123 
Instructions 
Please read along with and pay close attention to the 
following instructions as they are presented. We are interested 
in how people make simple decisions in a two-person situation which 
has payoffs. The payoff you get depends both on what you do and 
what the other person does. On the table in frontof you is a panel 
with two buttons marked "Response 1" and Response 2", a counter 
marked "Your points", a red "Go-light", and a display window. You 
will notice that the display window has a piece of paper attached 
to it which is divided into 4 boxes. The numbers in red are the 
number of points you win or lose; the numbers in black are the 
number of points that the other player wins or loses. 
The game is played as follows: One of you is "Player A" and 
the other is "Player B". To find out whether you are "Player A" or 
"Player B" look at the panel in frontof you. Above the red "Go-
light" you will see a lable which indicates whether you are "Player 
A" or "Player B". 
When the red light on your panel goes on, push response 
button 1 or 2. Be sure to make your response as soon as the red 
light goes on and do not push the response buttons at any other time. 
The person you are playing against will make choices on his panel 
at the same time you do. The numbers in the 4 boxes indicate the 
payoffs. For example, if Player A pushes Response 1 and Player B 
pushes Response 1, the upper left-hand box of your display window 
will light up, showing that Player A has won 8 points and Player B 
has won 20 points. If Player A pushes Response 2 and Player B 
pushes Response 2, the lower right-hand box of your display window 
wi 11 light up, showing that Player A wins 15 points and Player B 
loses 2 points. 
If Player A pushes Response 1 and Player B pushes Response 
2, the upper right-hand box of your display window will light up, 
showing that Player A wins 20 points and Player B wins 15 points. 
If Player A pushes Response 2 and Player B pushes Response 1, the 
lower left-hand box of your display window will light up showing 
that Player A loses 2 points and Player wins 6 points. 
Remember, the numbers in red show the number of points you 
get; the numbers in black show the number of points that the other 
person gets. You will both start the game with 50 points. The 
points you win or lose will automatically be added to or subtracted 
from this number. After you and the other player have made a res-
ponse and one of the boxes lights up, you may look at the counter 
to your right to see how many points you have accumulated. Your 
goal in the game is to make as many points as possible for yourself 
without regard to the number of points earned by the other. There 
will be a number of trials in this experiment, but you will not 
know in advance how many there will be. At the end of the game, for 
every 10 points showing on your counter, you will receive 1 cent. 
I will now ask each of you a couple of questions to make sure 
that you have understood the game. Please remain seated. I will 
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be with you in a moment. 
Turn the tape recorder off by pressing the stop button. 
APPENDIX B 
POSTEXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
» 
Here xs a list of word pairs whxch might be used to describe 
other people. This is a "person perception task" - that is, we are 
interested in the impressions participants in this experiment form 
of each other based on the games you have just finished playing. 
Thus, we would like your impressions of the other participant in 
this experiment. Please place a check mark on the appropriate line 
for each pair of adjectives. 
You will not see each other again in this experiment, and 
your ratings will be kept confidential, of course. So please mark 
down how you really feel. 
WARM 
SELFISH 
REPUTABLE 
INTELLIGENT 
WEAK 
CRUEL 
YOUNG 
DIRTY 
CALM 
PLEASANT 
COWARDLY 
ACTIVE 
HONEST 
UNTRUSTWORTHY 
: COLD 
: GENEROUS 
: DISREPUTABLE 
: UNINTELLIGENT 
: STRONG 
: KIND 
: OLD 
_: CLEAN 
: AGITATED 
: UNPLEASANT 
: BRAVE 
: PASSIVE 
: DISHONEST 
: TRUSTWORTHY 
PEACEFUL 
TENSE 
GOOD 
UNFAIR 
NICE 
HOSTILE 
HAPPY 
COMPETITIVE 
BEAUTIFUL 
UNSOCIABLE 
FEROCIOUS 
RELAXED 
BAD 
FAIR 
AWFUL 
FRIENDLY 
SAD 
NONCOMPETITIVE 
UGLY 
SOCIABLE 
Do you have any additional comments concerning the other partici-
pants in this experiment? 
What do you think the experimenter was trying to find out in this 
experiment? 
APPENDIX C 
GENEROSITY AND DOUBLECROSS PROPENSITIES 
ACROSS INITIAL STRATEGY CONDITIONS 
Table A 
Means and Standard Deviations of the 
Generosity Propensity, p(C2/RlC2), Across Initial 
Strategy Conditions 
Strategy Condition 
P DC DNC 
Mean .427 (19)a .241 (21) .522 (16) 
Standard Deviation .213 .193 .478 
Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants 
for whom the number of quadrant outcomes exceeded the criterion 
(3 or more). 
Table B 
Means and Standard Deviations of the 
Doublecross Propensity, p(Cl/R2C2) Across Initial 
Strategy Conditions 
Strategy Condition 
DC DNC 
Mean .579 (25)a .673 (20) 
Standard Deviation .241 .180 
Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants for 
whom the number of quadrant outcomes exceeded the criterion (3 or 
more). 
APPENDIX D 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR THE 
PROBABILITY OF NON-DOMINANT RESPONDING 
Table C 
Analysis of Variance of the Probabil i ty of Non-Dominant 
Responding as a Function of the I n i t i a l and Final 
Strategy Conditions 
Source 
A (Initial Strategy) 
B (Final Strategy) 
A X B Interaction 
Error (Between) 
SS 
.913 
4.901 
1.091 
24.015 
df 
2 
2 
4 
81 
MS 
.457 
2.451 
.273 
.296 
F 
1.54 
8.27* 
.92 
*£ <• 01 
APPENDIX E 
GENEROSITY AND DOUBLECROSS PROPENSITIES AS A 
FUNCTION OF THE INITIAL AND FINAL STRATEGY CONDITIONS 
Table D 
Means and Standard Deviations of the 
Generosity Propensity, p(C2/RlC2), as a Function of 
Initial and Final Strategy Conditions 
Initial Strategy 
Condition 
P 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
DC 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
DNC 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
P 
.362 
.156 
.574 
.104 
.510 
.333 
Final 
(3)a 
(2) 
(5) 
Strategy Condition 
DC 
.484 (5) 
.356 
.230 (9) 
.206 
.581 (6) 
.364 
[ 
DNC 
.360 (4) 
.257 
.456 (6) 
.341 
.438 (8) 
.338 
Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants for 
whom the number of quadrant outcomes exceeded the criterion (3 or 
more). 
Table E 
Means and Standard Deviations of the 
Doublecross Propensity, p(Cl/R2C2), as a Function of 
Initial and Final Strategy Conditions 
Final Strategy Condition 
DNC 
Initial Strategy 
Condition 
P 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
DC 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
DNC 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
DC 
.695 (6)a 
.383 
.776 (9) 
.193 
.599 (5) 
.309 
.653 
.248 
.647 
.225 
.681 
.180 
(7) 
(6) 
(5) 
3. 
Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants for 
whom the number of quadrant outcomes exceeded the criterion (3 or 
more). 
APPENDIX F 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR THE 
APPEASEMENT PROPENSITY 
Table F 
Analysis of Variance of the Appeasement Propensity, 
p(C2/RlCl), as a Function of the 
Initial and Final Strategy Conditions 
Source 
A (Initial Strategy) 
B (Final Strategy) 
A X B Interaction 
Error (Between) 
!§ 
.970 
3.968 
2.543 
25.006 
df 
2 
2 
4 
81 
MS 
.485 
1.984 
.636 
.309 
F 
1.57 
6.42* 
2.06 
*p <. 01 
APPENDIX G 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE 
FOR THE CAPITULATION PROPENSITY 
Table G 
Analysis of Variance of the Capitulation Propensity, 
p(C2/R2Cl), as a Function of the 
Initial and Final Strategy Conditions 
Source SS df MS 
A (Initial Strategy) 
B (Final Strategy) 
A X B Interaction 
Error (Between) 
*p <. 05 
**p <.01 
1.970 
3.359 
2.465 
12.410 
2 
1 
2 
54 
.985 
3.359 
1.232 
.230 
4.29* 
14.61** 
5.36** 
APPENDIX H 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE 
FOR SCORES ON THE THIRD FACTOR 
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Table H 
Analysis of Variance for Scores on the Third Factor 
Source SS df MS 
A (Initial Strategy) 
B (Final Strategy) 
A X B Interaction 
Error (Between) 
1.276 
5.620 
1.646 
67.836 
2 
2 
4 
81 
.638 
2.810 
.412 
.837 
.762 
3.355* 
.492 
* p<.05 
